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I. INTRODUCTION 
Assume that five unrelated actors use minors to commit five 
similar crimes at exactly the same time in five different states. First, 
seventeen-year-old defendant A uses various other minors who are 
actually older than defendant A to purchase and sell heroin in New 
York.1 Second, eighteen-year-old defendant B uses a sixteen-year-old 
minor and a seventeen-year-old minor to utter counterfeit money in 
Michigan.2 Third, eighteen-year-old defendant C uses a sixteen-year-
old minor and a seventeen-year-old minor to rob a bank in 
Minnesota.3 Fourth, twenty-year-old defendant D uses a seventeen-
year-old minor to rob a bank in Tennessee.4 Fifth, nineteen-year-old 
defendant E uses his seventeen-year-old girlfriend to purchase 
 
 1.  See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 2.  See United States v. Borkowski, 21 F. App’x 345, 346 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 3.  See United States v. Wingate, 369 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion 
reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 4.  See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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substances used to manufacture methamphetamine in Iowa.5 Section 
3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 
mandates a two-level sentence enhancement for defendants who use 
minors to commit federal crimes.6 One would assume that each of 
these five defendants would receive the same two-level sentence 
enhancement for using a minor to commit a crime. Not so fast. Instead 
of a uniform application of section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement, 
the defendants who committed these five similar crimes with minors 
will not be treated similarly when they stand before federal sentencing 
courts in different jurisdictions. Defendants C7 and E8 will receive the 
enhancement; defendants A,9 B,10 and D11 will not. What accounts for 
this disparity in sentencing these similarly situated federal defendants 
who used minors to commit these offenses? 
The sentencing disparity results from a split of authority on the 
issue of whether the United States Sentencing Commission 
(Sentencing Commission) exceeded its authority in promulgating a 
use-of-minor enhancement for every defendant, regardless of age, 
who uses a minor to commit a federal offense. Congress directed the 
Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement 
that ensures that the defendant’s age is relevant by focusing on adult 
defendants at least twenty-one years old who use minors to commit 
federal offenses. The Sentencing Commission defied Congress’s 
directive by making a defendant’s age absolutely irrelevant for 
purposes of the use-of-minor enhancement. Federal courts’ divergent 
approach to the Sentencing Commission’s expanded use-of-minor 
enhancement created the sentencing disparities referred to above. 
Instead of none of the defendants listed above receiving the use-of-
minor enhancement, which would track Congress’s intent, some 
defendants receive the enhancement; some do not. 
This Article takes a systematic and thorough approach to 
explaining how federal district courts can respond to the Sentencing 
Commission’s defiance of congressional intent and unlawful 
expansion of its limited authority. This Article will explain how 
federal sentencing courts can carry out Congress’s intent to impose 
 
 5.  See United States v. Harris, 390 F.3d 572, 572 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 6.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (2011). 
 7.  See Wingate, 369 F.3d at 1032. 
 8.  See Harris, 390 F.3d at 572–73. 
 9.  See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 10.  See United States v. Borkowski, 21 F. App’x 345, 346–47 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 11.  See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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use-of-minor enhancements only on adult defendants at least twenty-
one years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses. 
Part II develops the plain language of the congressional directive 
to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor 
enhancement with an age restriction for defendants. Specifically, 
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences 
for defendants at least twenty-one years of age who use minors to 
commit federal offenses and, in doing so, to consider the proximity in 
age between the defendant and minor. Part III shows how the 
Sentencing Commission responded to the congressional directive by 
promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement that altogether eliminated 
the relevance of a defendant’s age. Part IV then recounts the split 
among federal courts over the issue of whether the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its congressional authority in promulgating a 
use-of-minor enhancement that makes the age of the defendant 
irrelevant. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit is on one side of the debate—the minority side, and the side on 
which this Article stakes its position—with the United States Courts 
of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits on the 
other side. 
Because district courts will undoubtedly continue to confront the 
issue of whether section 3B1.4 can be applied to defendants under the 
age of twenty-one, this issue needs to be explored and analyzed more 
fully than it already has. This Article seeks to add a stronger voice and 
a more solid foundation for the conclusion that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority by eliminating the relevance of the 
defendant’s age in applying a two-level use-of-minor enhancement. To 
that end, the analysis in Part V provides additional support for the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend that defendants under the age 
of twenty-one who use minors to commit federal offenses should 
receive sentence enhancements; it also maintains that Congress 
certainly did not intend that the age of the defendant and the 
proximity in age between the defendant and minor would be rendered 
wholly irrelevant. In a nutshell, Part V argues that the congressional 
directive’s plain language, legislative history, and context in which it 
was enacted require the conclusion that Congress intended the 
Sentencing Commission to retain age as a relevant factor in applying 
the use-of-minor enhancement. Applying this reasoning, district 
courts can adopt what this Article describes as the “no-authority 
option” to hold that because the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 
authority in promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement without age 
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restrictions for defendants, section 3B1.4 will not be applied to 
defendants under the age of twenty-one. Until the Supreme Court of 
the United States adopts or rejects the no-authority option, 
defendants under the age of twenty-one will receive markedly 
disparate sentences depending on where they commit their federal 
offenses. 
Notwithstanding the circuit split on the issue of the Sentencing 
Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4 without age 
restrictions, all district courts—no matter in which circuit they 
reside—have the discretion to abrogate the Sentencing Commission’s 
expansion of the use-of-minor enhancement that makes the 
defendant’s age irrelevant. District courts are not necessarily 
confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition to utilize the no-
authority option. On the contrary, Part VI explains that regardless of 
a court’s—or even the Court’s—position on the soundness of adopting 
the no-authority option, every district court has the authority under an 
advisory-guidelines system to reject the application of the use-of-
minor enhancement to defendants under the age of twenty-one. First, 
district courts can utilize what this Article calls the “policy-
disagreement option” to explicitly lodge a policy disagreement against 
the Sentencing Commission’s expanded use-of-minor enhancement by 
rejecting its application to defendants under the age of twenty-one. 
Second, district courts can decide, on a case-by-case basis, to adopt 
what this Article calls the “individualized-assessment option” to 
determine that section 3B1.4’s two-level use-of-minor enhancement 
should not be applied to a particular defendant under twenty-one 
years of age in a particular case because it would result in an excessive 
sentence. 
No matter whether federal courts ultimately adopt the no-
authority option, policy-disagreement option, or individualized-
assessment option, this Article should equip federal courts with a 
three-part analytical framework that can be used to reject the 
Sentencing Commission’s expansion of its authority and open 
defiance of Congress’s intent. By choosing one of these three options, 
federal courts will carry out Congress’s intent to apply the use-
of-minor enhancement only to defendants at least twenty-one years of 
age. 
II. CONGRESS DIRECTED THE SENTENCING COMMISSION TO 
PROMULGATE A USE-OF-MINOR ENHANCEMENT FOR DEFENDANTS 
AT LEAST TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE WHO USE MINORS UNDER 
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THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN TO COMMIT FEDERAL OFFENSES 
Eighteen years ago, Congress enacted the substantial Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Crime Bill).12 
According to the United States Department of Justice, the Crime Bill 
took “six years of hard work” to enact and “is the largest crime bill in 
the history of the country.”13 As a small part of this massive piece of 
legislation, Congress drafted eight sections specifically dealing with 
youth violence.14 In section 140008, entitled “Solicitation of Minor to 
Commit Crime,” Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to 
“promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide that a 
defendant 21 years of age or older who has been convicted of an 
offense shall receive an appropriate sentence enhancement if the 
defendant involved a minor in the commission of the offense.”15 
Congress further instructed the Sentencing Commission as follows: 
provide that the guideline enhancement . . . shall apply for any 
offense in relation to which the defendant has solicited, 
procured, recruited, counseled, encouraged, trained, directed, 
commanded, intimidated, or otherwise used or attempted to use 
any person less than 18 years of age with the intent that the 
minor would commit a Federal offense.16 
A fair characterization of this congressional directive is that 
Congress intended that the Sentencing Commission adopt a use-of-
minor enhancement for adult defendants at least twenty-one years of 
age who use minors under the age of eighteen to commit federal 
offenses. 
Congress did not simply direct the Sentencing Commission to 
adopt a use-of-minor enhancement with a twenty-one-year-old age 
restriction without providing additional instruction. Congress also 
charged that when promulgating a guideline, the Sentencing 
Commission must consider, among other factors, “the possible 
relevance of the proximity in age between the offender and the 
minor(s) involved in the offense.”17 By instructing the Sentencing 
 
 12.  Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.). 
 13.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994 (Oct. 24, 1994), http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt. 
 14.  See §§ 140001–140008, 108 Stat. at 2031–33. 
 15.  Id. § 140008(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 16.  Id. § 140008(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 17.  Id. § 140008(b)(4) (emphasis added); see also id. § 140008(b)(1)–(3) (charging the 
Sentencing Commission to also consider the following: “(1) the severity of the crime that 
the defendant intended the minor to commit; (2) the number of minors that the defendant 
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Commission to consider the proximity in age between the defendant 
and the minor, Congress continued to reveal its intent that the age of 
the defendant is important in applying a use-of-minor enhancement. 
Congress revealed its belief that the greater the age proximity, the 
greater the importance that a defendant at least twenty-one years old 
should receive enhanced punishment for using a minor to commit a 
federal offense. Congress expressed less concern about enhanced 
punishment in cases where a defendant and a minor are close to being 
the same age. Notably, Congress revealed no intent that the 
Sentencing Commission should consider eliminating the relevance of 
the defendant’s age or the proximity in age between the defendant 
and the minor used. 
Viewing all pieces of the congressional directive—the age 
restriction of “21 years of age or older” for defendants, the age 
restriction of less than eighteen years of age for minors, the 
“proximity in age” restriction, and the directive’s title—Congress 
revealed its intent to punish adults at least twenty-one years of age 
who use younger minors under the age of eighteen to commit federal 
offenses. If the Sentencing Commission chose to increase punishment 
for adult defendants much older than the minor used, then nothing in 
the directive foreclosed such a decision. If the Sentencing Commission 
chose to eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age altogether, 
however, then Congress’s efforts to focus enhanced punishment on 
adult defendants who are older than the minors used are rendered 
impotent. The most reasonable interpretation of the congressional 
directive’s plain language indicates an intent to enhance the sentences 
of adults who corrupt young people by recruiting them into crime; it 
does not indicate an intent to enhance sentences for defendants who 
are nearly the same age or younger than the minors used. Although 
the term use-of-minor enhancement readily rolls off the lips, it actually 
misdirects the debate by scrubbing any reference to an age restriction 
for defendants. Perhaps a term that more accurately reflects 
Congress’s intent would be a corruption-of-a-minor-by-an-adult-at-
least-twenty-one-years-of-age enhancement. Notwithstanding the 
technical accuracy of that term, it is not exactly a tongue-friendly 
description of the enhancement. 
 
used or attempted to use in relation to the offense; [and] (3) the fact that involving a minor 
in a crime of violence is frequently of even greater seriousness than involving a minor in a 
drug trafficking offense, for which the [G]uidelines already provide a two-level 
enhancement”). 
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No matter the proper coinage for the enhancement, a simple 
reading of the directive’s text shows that Congress purposefully listed 
the defendant’s age and the proximity in age between the defendant 
and minor to ensure that the Sentencing Commission promulgated an 
enhancement to punish the appropriate defendants who use minors to 
commit federal offenses. Can Congress’s directive to the Sentencing 
Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement be 
reasonably interpreted to encompass every defendant, regardless of 
age? Is it a reasonable interpretation of the plain language of section 
140008’s directive to conclude that Congress did not in any way 
restrict the Sentencing Commission from adopting a use-of-minor 
enhancement that eliminated the relevance of the defendant’s age? As 
described in Part III, the Sentencing Commission eliminated any age 
restriction for defendants when it promulgated the use-of-minor 
enhancement, making the defendant’s age entirely irrelevant in 
sentencing. 
III. SENTENCING COMMISSION PROMULGATED A USE-OF-MINOR 
ENHANCEMENT TO APPLY TO ALL DEFENDANTS, REGARDLESS OF 
AGE 
Acting under the specific congressional directive detailed in 
section 140008, the Sentencing Commission faithfully implemented a 
sentence enhancement for adult defendants at least twenty-one years 
of age who use minors to commit federal offenses. The Sentencing 
Commission did not stop with adult defendants who are at least 
twenty-one years old, however. By its own admission, the Sentencing 
Commission promulgated a use-of-minor enhancement “in a slightly 
broader form”18 than directed by Congress: “If the defendant used or 
attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit 
the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the 
offense, increase by 2 levels.”19 The result of the Sentencing 
Commission’s broadening of the enhancement’s reach is that every 
defendant, regardless of age, will receive the same two-level 
enhancement for using a minor to commit a federal offense. The 
Sentencing Commission rendered the defendant’s age and the 
proximity in age between the defendant and minor irrelevant for 
sentencing purposes. 
 
 18.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 527 (2003). 
 19.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (2011). 
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The process of promulgating the use-of-minor enhancement (or 
any guideline for that matter) did not end with the Sentencing 
Commission’s creation of the enhancement. The Sentencing 
Commission is required to submit its proposed guidelines and reasons 
for promulgating them to Congress.20 Congress gave itself a 180-day 
review period during which it can reject, modify, or approve a 
proposed guideline.21 If Congress takes no action on a proposed 
guideline, then it automatically takes effect.22 In submitting the use-of-
minor enhancement without age restrictions to Congress, the 
Sentencing Commission provided shallow support for the 
enhancement: “Reason for Amendment: This amendment implements 
the directive in Section 140008 of the [Crime Bill] (pertaining to the 
use of a minor in the commission of an offense) in a slightly broader 
form.”23 The Sentencing Commission provided no policy reasons why 
it eliminated age as a relevant factor for sentencing defendants who 
use minors to commit federal offenses. Congress did not take action to 
reject or modify the Sentencing Commission’s use-of-minor 
enhancement; therefore, the proposed guideline automatically took 
effect as section 3B1.4. 
Although Congress did not reject the Sentencing Commission’s 
use-of-minor enhancement’s “slightly broader form,” Congress did 
express its disapproval for another proposed guideline that was 
submitted to Congress along with the use-of-minor enhancement.24 
Specifically, Congress reiterated its support for treating crack cocaine 
much harsher than powder cocaine under the Guidelines by 
disapproving the Sentencing Commission’s proposed guideline “that 
would have eliminated the 100:1 sentencing ratio that treats one who 
deals in a given quantity of crack cocaine the same as it treats one who 
deals in 100 times as much powder cocaine.”25 
By laying out the congressional directive and the Sentencing 
Commission’s response, the stage has been set for a discussion of 
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its congressional 
authority by scrubbing any reference to the age of a defendant in 
 
 20.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2000). 
 21.  See id. 
 22.  See id. 
 23.  Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995). 
 24.  See id. at 25076–77 (proposing a guideline to lessen the sentencing disparities 
between crack cocaine and powder cocaine). 
 25.  United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 845 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Act of Oct. 
30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334, 334 (1995). 
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imposing the same enhanced sentence for every defendant who uses 
of a minor to commit a federal offense. This Article asks whether 
Congress’s directive—including its plain language, legislative history, 
and the context in which it was enacted—can be fairly interpreted as 
depicting an intent to apply the same two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement to every defendant regardless of the defendant’s age or 
the proximity in age between the defendant and the minor used. 
Federal courts have disagreed on the answer to this consequential 
question. This Article contends that Congress used clear, direct, 
unambiguous, and specific language to ensure that the age of the 
defendant was relevant for sentencing purposes, particularly when the 
plain language of the directive’s text is read in context with other parts 
of the Crime Bill and the directive’s legislative history. Based on 
Congress’s intent to enhance sentences only for adult defendants at 
least twenty-one years of age who use minors to commit federal 
offenses, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by 
ignoring Congress’s focus on age and instead promulgated a use-of-
minor enhancement that applies the same enhancement to every 
defendant—no matter how old or how young. 
IV. FEDERAL COURTS SPLIT ON WHETHER THE SENTENCING 
COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN PROMULGATING 
SECTION 3B1.4 WITHOUT AN AGE RESTRICTION FOR DEFENDANTS 
Courts have inconsistently interpreted the scope of the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority when promulgating section 
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Sentencing Commission 
exceeded its authority for two reasons.26 First, Congress’s words must 
have meaning; they lose meaning when the Sentencing Commission 
ignores Congress’s plain language—a use-of-minor enhancement 
without any age restriction contradicts the congressional directive to 
include an age restriction. Second, Congress’s intent is gleaned from 
the directive’s text and legislative history, not from its silent failure to 
reject the Sentencing Commission’s expanded enhancement during a 
review period. Four circuit courts—the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits—
determined that the Sentencing Commission acted within its 
significant discretion in adopting the enhancement without any age 
 
 26.  See Butler, 207 F.3d at 849. 
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restrictions for defendants.27 These courts provide one or more of the 
following reasons for deferring to the Sentencing Commission’s 
decision to eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age in applying 
the use-of-minor enhancement. First, the enhancement is technically 
not at odds with the directive because defendants at least twenty-one 
years of age will always receive the enhancement. Second, the 
Sentencing Commission could have determined that every 
defendant—regardless of age—can exert as much negative influence 
over minors as twenty-one-year-old defendants. Third, because 
Congress did not reject the Sentencing Commission’s expanded 
enhancement during the 180-day review period, Congress displayed its 
true intent not by the language used in the directive, but by its silence 
in not rejecting the proposed guideline. Finally, a federal district court 
in New York refused to apply the use-of-minor enhancement to a 
defendant who was himself a minor and used minors who were older 
than he to commit a federal offense. This Article will now explore 
these decisions in turn. 
A. Sixth Circuit Held that the Sentencing Commission Exceeded Its 
Congressional Authority in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 Without 
an Age Restriction 
Of the federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of 
whether section 3B1.4 constitutes a reasonable implementation of 
Congress’s directive, the Sixth Circuit is the only court to hold that the 
Sentencing Commission had no authority to enact it without age 
restrictions.28 Similar to the split among the circuit courts, the issue did 
not enjoy unanimity from the Sixth Circuit panel that decided it.29 
In United States v. Butler, twenty-year-old Julius Retic and a 
seventeen-year-old minor robbed a bank.30 Retic pleaded guilty to 
armed bank robbery and to the use of a firearm during the robbery.31 
Imposing a two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section 3B1.4, 
 
 27.  See United States v. Wingate, 369 F.3d 1028, 1031–32 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion 
reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 
1158–59 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 28.  See Butler, 207 F.3d at 849. 
 29.  See id. at 841 (explaining that the separate opinion of Judge Jones in Part II.B.1. 
is the majority opinion and “constitutes the opinion of the court on the issue addressed in 
Part II.B.1.”).  
 30.  Id. at 842. 
 31.  Id. 
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the district court sentenced Retic to 120 months’ imprisonment.32 On 
appeal, Retic argued that because section 3B1.4 applies to defendants 
of any age, it exceeded the scope of Congress’s mandate to the 
Sentencing Commission that included a twenty-one-year-old age 
restriction.33 
Over the voice of a dissenting judge, the two-judge majority 
concluded “that the United States Sentencing Commission failed to 
comport with a clear congressional directive when it eliminated the 
requirement that the defendant be at least twenty-one years old to be 
subject to enhancement under [section] 3B1.4.”34 Evincing a clear 
understanding that Congress delegated significant discretion to the 
Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines, the Sixth Circuit 
observed that the Supreme Court has made clear that the Sentencing 
Commission must still “bow to the specific directives of Congress.”35 
Citing its own Sixth Circuit precedent, the court further recognized 
that courts must only defer to the Sentencing Commission’s 
interpretation of a congressional directive if the interpretation is 
“sufficiently reasonable.”36 
Confronting the reasonableness of the Sentencing Commission’s 
decision to remove age restrictions from the use-of-minor 
enhancement, the Sixth Circuit stated that it could “not conceive of a 
clearer example than that presented here where the [Sentencing] 
Commission has so flatly ignored a clear Congressional directive.”37 
Despite the clear directive to the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate guidelines “to provide that a defendant 21 years of age or 
older who has been convicted of an offense shall receive an 
appropriate sentence enhancement if the defendant involved a minor 
in the commission of the offense,”38 the Sixth Circuit was alarmed that 
“the [Sentencing] Commission simply removed the age restriction.”39 
“Looking at the face of both the directive and the guideline,” the 
court declared that it was “not convinced that the [Sentencing] 
Commission’s interpretation of the age restriction is ‘sufficiently 
reasonable.’”40 Instead, the court concluded that the Sentencing 
 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  See id. at 844. 
 34.  Id. at 849 (emphasis added).  
 35.  Id. at 850 (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)). 
 36.  Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 140008(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1796, 2033 (1994)). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
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Commission’s proposed guideline “was a direct overruling of an 
explicit Congressional declaration because it eliminated the age limit, 
lock, stock[,] and barrel.”41 
The Sixth Circuit flatly rejected the Sentencing Commission’s 
characterization that it simply implemented the congressional 
directive in a “slightly broader form.”42 The court believed that by 
“reflexively relying” on how the Sentencing Commission 
characterized its own proposed guideline, courts would, in effect, be 
improperly abandoning their judicial role in deciding whether a 
guideline accurately reflected congressional intent.43 The court was 
hardly persuaded that the wholesale elimination of the minimum-age 
requirement was simply “slightly broader” than Congress’s directive.44 
Calling section 3B1.4 “far more dramatic” than Congress’s directive, 
the court highlighted some foreseeable consequences stemming from 
the elimination of an age restriction: “As this case demonstrates, 
without the age limit that Congress originally authorized, the 
guideline introduces a whole host of situations where defendants 
under age twenty[-]one can receive enhancements for engaging in 
criminal activities with youths of similar age, or perhaps even older 
than the defendants themselves.”45 
The Sixth Circuit explained that the age restriction was “a core 
aspect” of the congressional directive to the Sentencing Commission.46 
The court surmised that Congress created the age restriction out of a 
“concern that the existence of an age differential allows an older, 
adult party to influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous 
behavior.”47 The court explained that it “is hardly a novel concept” for 
the law to consider the ages of an adult defendant and a minor 
accomplice in lawmaking.48 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 527 
(2003)). 
 43.  Id. (citing United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)). 
 44.  Id. at 850–51. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 851. 
 47.  Id.; see also United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 
2008) (revealing that the district court believed that “[t]he spirit of the [section 3B1.4] 
enhancement is to punish adults who exploit minors” such that section 3B1.4 does not 
apply to a defendant who begins using minors when the defendant is also a minor). 
 48.  Butler, 207 F.3d at 851 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1)(a) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(d) (West 2008) (“Any person 21 years of 
age or older who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is 
under 16 years of age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony . . . .”)).  
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Finally, the Sixth Circuit confronted the so-called congressional 
silence theory that Congress’s failure to reject the Sentencing 
Commission’s expanded use-of-minor enhancement during the review 
period revealed that Congress implicitly accepted the enhancement as 
a true reflection of congressional intent.49 Noting that the Supreme 
Court has counseled that “[n]ot every silence is pregnant” and that 
silence is not dispositive “when it is contrary to all other textual and 
contextual evidence of congressional intent,” the Sixth Circuit 
determined that “the original twenty-one[-]year[-]old age limit is 
sufficiently clear to overcome an argument from silence.”50 
Expounding on why it would not rely on the congressional silence 
theory to allow the Sentencing Commission to remove all age 
restrictions from a use-of-minor enhancement, the Sixth Circuit 
explained that to do “so would lead courts wholly to abandon their 
role of assessing whether enacted guidelines comport with 
congressional intent.”51 The court cautioned that because every 
proposed guideline is subject to congressional review and every 
enacted guideline has survived congressional rejection, blind 
adherence to the congressional silence theory “would thus dictate that 
all enacted guidelines inherently satisfied [c]ongressional intent, and 
would eliminate [the judiciary’s] vital role . . . of squaring the enacted 
guideline with the original statutory language.”52 The Sixth Circuit 
pleaded for courts to “hold[] the [Sentencing] Commission 
accountable as an agency of limited powers.”53 
Not all of the judges on the Butler panel agreed that the 
Sentencing Commission had exceeded its authority in promulgating 
section 3B1.4. Judge Clay issued a dissenting opinion in which he first 
acknowledged that Congress had limited the enhancement to 
defendants at least twenty-one years of age, while the Sentencing 
Commission dropped the age restriction entirely, “rendering the 
sentence enhancement applicable to defendants of all ages.”54 Judge 
Clay further acknowledged that “[a]t first blush, it appears . . . that 
Congress intended—and provided in unambiguous terms—for 
sentence enhancement for solicitation of a minor to commit crime 
 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  Id. (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991)). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 852 (first alteration in original) (quoting Daniel J. Freed, Federal 
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1748 (1992)). 
 54.  Id. at 844 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
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only for defendants age 21 and older.”55 Judge Clay even declared, “A 
clearer expression of congressional intent is unimaginable.”56 
Conceding that there is “some facial appeal” to the argument that 
defendants under the age of twenty-one should not receive a use-of-
minor enhancement, Judge Clay was not persuaded that the plain 
language of Congress’s directive controls the issue.57 
According to Judge Clay, “Congress’[s] expression of intent as to 
[section] 3B1.4 did not begin and end with its enactment of [section] 
140008.”58 Instead of focusing on the congressional directive as 
indicative of Congress’s intent, Judge Clay chose to focus on the 
180-day review period, under which Congress’s failure to reject the 
Sentencing Commission’s proposed guideline carried consequences.59 
Judge Clay explained that the Sentencing Commission had expressly 
informed Congress that it had implemented the congressional 
directive in a “slightly broader form,” which did not persuade 
Congress to reject the proposed guideline.60 Judge Clay also found it 
telling that Congress did not reject the proposed use-of-minor 
enhancement even though Congress rejected some of the Sentencing 
Commission’s other proposed guidelines that were submitted at the 
same time.61 
Based on “this historical backdrop” and “context,” Judge Clay 
determined that Congress’s failure to reject the Sentencing 
Commission’s use-of-minor enhancement “even when notified that it 
was different from the directive enacted in [section] 140008, Congress, 
in effect, approved of [the enhancement] as an appropriate reflection 
of its policy on the sentencing of those who involved minors in their 
crimes.”62 Judge Clay actually agreed that Congress’s “initial intent” 
to limit the enhancement to defendants at least twenty-one years old 
would have been at odds with section 3B1.4.63 But Judge Clay was 
persuaded that “the history behind the passage of [section] 3B1.4 
compels a finding that the intent of Congress changed” when 
“Congress ultimately failed to express disagreement with expansion of 
 
 55.  Id. at 845 (emphases added). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 844–45. 
 58.  Id. at 845. 
 59.  Id. at 844. 
 60.  Id. at 845 (quoting Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States 
Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995)). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  Id. at 845–46. 
 63.  Id. at 846. 
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the enhancement to include defendants under the age of [twenty-
one].”64 Based on this reasoning, Judge Clay would have held that 
section 3B1.4 was not at odds with the intent of Congress.65 
Less than two years after Butler, the Sixth Circuit again 
confronted the issue of whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded 
its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. In United States v. 
Borkowski, Melisa Borkowski pleaded guilty to uttering counterfeit 
currency when she was eighteen years old.66 Because Borkowski had 
used two minor friends, one who was seventeen years old and the 
other sixteen, the district court applied a two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement under section 3B1.4.67 The enhancement resulted in a 
sentencing range of between twenty-one and twenty-seven months’ 
imprisonment.68 The district court sentenced Borkowski to twenty-one 
months’ imprisonment.69 
Borkowski appealed her sentence, claiming that section 3B1.4’s 
use-of-minor enhancement exceeded congressional authorization.70 
Addressing the issue on appeal, the Sixth Circuit explained that after 
oral arguments but before the panel could issue a decision, another 
Sixth Circuit panel had already decided Butler, which “explicitly” held 
that section “3B1.4 was invalid to the extent that it applied to 
criminals who committed their crimes when under the age of twenty-
one.”71 The Borkowski panel noted that this issue had split the Butler 
panel and that the two-judge majority decision had rejected “the 
cogent reasoning” of the lone dissenting judge.72 Gleefully noting that 
three circuit courts had disagreed with Butler,73 such that the Sixth 
 
 64.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  21 F. App’x 345, 346 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 67.  See id. 
 68.  See id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. (citing United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849–52 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 72.  Id. (citing Butler, 207 F.3d at 844–46). 
 73.  See id. at 346–47 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855–58 (7th Cir. 
2001); United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 512–13 (4th Cir. 2001)). The assertion that the Eleventh Circuit had 
disagreed with Butler on the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate a use-of-
minor enhancement without an age restriction is inaccurate. As seen in Part IV.B., the 
Eighth Circuit has also made the same erroneous assertion about the Eleventh Circuit. See 
United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. 
McClain as support that the Eleventh Circuit, among other circuits, has concluded that the 
Sentencing Commission did not exceed its authority when the Commission determined 
that section 3B1.4 applies to those under the age of twenty-one). In McClain, a case 
involving adults who used a sixteen-year-old minor to cash counterfeit checks, the 
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Circuit was “clearly in a minority,” the Borkowski panel applauded 
the notion that the “clear circuit conflict” would ultimately have to be 
resolved by the Supreme Court.74 Notwithstanding the panel’s obvious 
distaste for the Butler decision, the panel in Borkowski nonetheless 
acknowledged that it was “bound by the holding in Butler.”75 As such, 
the court held that it had no choice but to “reverse and remand with 
instructions for the district court to resentence in accordance with this 
opinion and with Butler.”76 When the two-level enhancement is not 
used in calculating Borkowski’s offense level, her sentencing range 
dropped from between twenty-one and twenty-seven months’ 
imprisonment to between fifteen and twenty-one months’ 
imprisonment. 
The precedential value of Butler is not as clear as the Borkowski 
court believed. Instead, it is controversial, at least to me, to declare 
that the Sixth Circuit actually held in Butler that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority when it promulgated section 
3B1.4. Although it is true that two judges agreed with that conclusion 
while one judge did not, all three judges on the panel agreed that 
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement should not have been 
applied to Retic because the prosecution had failed to prove that 
Retic actually used a minor in committing the federal offense.77 
 
Eleventh Circuit did not actually address the issue of whether the Sentencing Commission 
had acted within its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 
1281–82. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit only focused on (1) whether section 3B1.4 contains 
a scienter requirement, i.e., whether the defendant knew that he was using a minor, and (2) 
“whether section 3B1.4 applies to the jointly undertaken criminal activity of co-
conspirators.” Id. at 1284–88. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the court seemed to actually 
dismiss the idea that Congress intended to support the Sentencing Commission’s 
broadening of the use-of-minor enhancement to include every defendant, regardless of 
age:  
  Ideally, broad application of section 3B1.4 will deter adult criminals from 
committing crimes with even those persons who, although they are over the age 
of seventeen, appear to be minors. We believe that a construction promoting this 
broad deterrent effect, rather than one encouraging willful blindness, effectuates 
Congress’s intent in enacting the sentencing provision.  
Id. at 1286–87 (first emphasis added). This understanding tends to imply that the Eleventh 
Circuit believes that section 3B1.4 is only valid to the extent that it applies to adult 
defendants, and not to all defendants regardless of age. Regardless of one’s ability to read 
tea leaves about the Eleventh Circuit’s presumed position on the section 3B1.4 issue, it is 
impossible to firmly place the Eleventh Circuit on either side of this debate. 
 74.  See Borkowski, 21 F. App’x at 347. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 846–49 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
Judges Jones and Cole concurred “in the judgment announced by Judge Clay, and with 
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Because the panel unanimously held that the district court had 
erroneously applied a use-of-minor enhancement under section 3B1.4, 
there was no reason to seek a point of disagreement by addressing the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4. The 
split decision on the Sentencing Commission’s authority was arguably 
unnecessary—why resolve a controversial, circuit-splitting, and panel-
splitting issue when the resolution of the issue is not required to 
decide the case? Had the Borkowski panel applied that line of 
reasoning, it would not have been bound by the apparent dicta from 
the Butler panel. Instead, the Borkowski panel could have addressed 
the issue anew, giving whatever deference it wanted to the two 
opinions emanating from the Butler panel. Given the rhetoric used by 
the Borkowski panel, it is likely that the Sixth Circuit would not have 
found itself as the lone dissenter on the section 3B1.4 issue. That 
distinction would have been left for this Article. 
Fortunately, there is one circuit opinion—the Sixth Circuit’s 
fractured opinion in Butler—that creates a circuit split and lends 
judicial support to this Article’s contention that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. As 
with any legal conclusion, however, the persuasiveness of the 
reasoning in reaching that conclusion is far more important than 
simply looking around to see who else agrees with it (but it certainly 
helps when impressive authorities agree with your reasoning and legal 
conclusion). Part V of this Article will expound on the Butler court’s 
reasoning and demonstrate why the Sixth Circuit—even though in a 
clear minority among the federal circuit courts—correctly determined 
that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its congressional authority 
and defied Congress’s intent by promulgating a use-of-minor 
enhancement that made the age of the defendant entirely irrelevant. 
B. Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits Held that the 
Sentencing Commission Acted Within Its Congressional Authority 
in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 Without an Age Restriction 
Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s conviction that the 
Sentencing Commission failed to follow Congress’s directive, the vast 
amount of judicial authority supports the Sentencing Commission’s 
promulgation of section 3B1.4 in its expanded form. The Fourth, 
 
most of Judge Clay’s well-reasoned opinion,” including Judge Clay’s opinion as it related 
to the inapplicability of section 3B1.4 to Retic). 
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Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that the Sentencing 
Commission acted within its broad authority in promulgating section 
3B1.4 without age restrictions for defendants. 
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to hold that the 
Sentencing Commission did not abuse its discretion in promulgating 
section 3B1.4 to include all defendants, regardless of age, who use 
minors to commit federal offenses.78 In United States v. Ramsey, 
nineteen-year old Joseph Ramsey used his sixteen-year old brother to 
sell crack cocaine to an undercover federal agent.79 After Ramsey 
pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine, the district court applied a 
two-level enhancement under section 3B1.4 for using a minor to 
commit the federal offense and sentenced Ramsey to 121 months’ 
imprisonment.80 Even though Ramsey had failed to challenge the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4 
before the district court, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless felt 
“compelled to address the validity of section 3B1.4.”81 
Rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Butler, the Seventh 
Circuit held “that the Sentencing Commission did not abuse its 
discretion when it promulgated section 3B1.4 to include all 
defendants, regardless of age.”82 The court recognized that even 
though Congress had directed the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate a guideline that applied to defendants twenty-one years of 
age or older, the Sentencing Commission nonetheless eliminated the 
age requirement altogether and made it “applicable to defendants of 
all ages.”83 Setting the stage to explain its holding, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that the Sentencing Commission “enjoys significant discretion 
in formulating guidelines.”84 The court also evinced an understanding 
that the Sentencing Commission’s discretion is not limitless: “Broad as 
that discretion may be . . . it must bow to the specific directives of 
Congress . . . [as reflected in] the statutory language.”85 With that 
understanding of the scope of the Sentencing Commission’s discretion 
to promulgate guidelines, the Seventh Circuit asked “whether the 
[Sentencing] Commission obeyed the specific directive of Congress . . . 
 
 78.  See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 79.  See id. at 854–55. 
 80.  See id. at 855. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 855–56. 
 83.  See id. at 856. 
 84.  Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377 (1989)). 
 85.  Id. (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)). 
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that an enhancement be applied to all defendants age twenty-one and 
older.”86 
The Seventh Circuit first acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit had 
decided that section 3B1.4 could not be applied to defendants younger 
than twenty-one years of age because the Sentencing Commission’s 
total elimination of the age restriction constituted “a direct overruling 
of an explicit Congressional declaration.”87 But the Seventh Circuit 
did not see things as black and white as the Sixth Circuit did. From the 
Seventh Circuit’s viewpoint, “the [Sentencing] Commission did 
promulgate a guideline that encompassed the directive of Congress.”88 
According to the court, section 3B1.4 follows the congressional 
directive that “defendants age twenty-one or older will receive a 
sentence enhancement,” and that it “simply expanded the provision to 
encompass a greater number of defendants” who are younger than 
twenty-one.89 The Seventh Circuit opined that because the guideline 
was not “at odds” with Congress’s directive, the Sentencing 
Commission enjoyed the discretion “to enlarge the category of 
defendants to whom” the enhancement would apply.90 
The Seventh Circuit then noted that the Sentencing Commission 
is required to consider more than just Congress’s directive when 
amending the Guidelines.91 The court explained that in promulgating 
guidelines, the Sentencing Commission must consider a defendant’s 
age,92 “the possible relevance of the proximity in age between the 
offender and the minor(s) involved in the offense,”93 and how best to 
ensure that sentences are uniform across the country.94 The Seventh 
Circuit speculated that “[i]t is possible that . . . the [S]entencing 
[C]ommission concluded that a nineteen[-]year old defendant” can 
exert as much influence over and cause the same amount of harm to a 
minor as a twenty-one year old defendant, requiring “equal 
punishment” under the Guidelines.95 
The Seventh Circuit, however, did not view the validity of section 
3B1.4 as an open-and-shut issue. The court acknowledged that section 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 856–57 (quoting United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 850 (6th Cir. 2000)).  
 88.  Id. at 857. 
 89.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1) (2000)). 
 93.  Id. (quoting the Crime Bill, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 140008(b)(4), 108 Stat. 1796, 
2033 (1994)). 
 94.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994)). 
 95.  Id. 
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140008’s legislative history weakened the conclusion that the 
Sentencing Commission obeyed Congress’s directive in eliminating 
the age restriction.96 Providing a brief insight into the legislative 
history behind section 140008 (which I will further illuminate in Part 
V.B.), the Seventh Circuit noted that the congressional directive to 
enhance the sentences for defendants at least twenty-one years old 
originally emanated from the Senate version of the provision that 
would have applied the enhancement to defendants eighteen years of 
age or older.97 The court thus recognized that the Sentencing 
Commission’s enhancement was broader than the congressional 
directive, which was broader than the original Senate formulation.98 
That brief foray into legislative history did not dissuade the court from 
holding that the Sentencing Commission had not overstepped 
congressional bounds. 
As a final leg of the decision’s foundational stool, the Seventh 
Circuit spun the discussion from whether the Sentencing Commission 
had exceeded its authority by failing to follow the congressional 
directive to whether Congress implicitly ratified the Sentencing 
Commission’s expansive guideline. Admitting that “it is possible that 
the [Sentencing] Commission might not have given sufficient weight 
to the congressional directive,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
Congress had the opportunity to reject section 3B1.4’s “slightly 
broader form.”99 Because Congress had specifically rejected some of 
the guidelines that were proposed on the same date as section 3B1.4, 
but did not reject section 3B1.4, the Seventh Circuit concluded, 
“Congress implicitly accepted the [Sentencing] Commission’s 
elimination of the age restriction.”100 Based on this reasoning, the 
Seventh Circuit held, “We thus find that the Sentencing Commission 
did not misread congressional intent, but rather was exercising 
reasonable discretion in promulgating a guideline that reaches 
defendants under age twenty-one.”101 
Not long after the Seventh Circuit split from the Sixth Circuit, the 
Fourth Circuit lined up behind the conclusion that the Sentencing 
Commission had acted within its authority when it promulgated 
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See id. at 857–58. 
 98.  See id. at 858. 
 99.  Id. (quoting Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 
60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995)). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
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section 3B1.4 without an age restriction.102 In United States v. Murphy, 
eighteen-year old Demarco Murphy pleaded guilty to armed 
carjacking offenses.103 Imposing a two-level enhancement under 
section 3B1.4 for using a minor to commit the offenses, the district 
court sentenced Murphy to 221 months’ imprisonment.104 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead in resolving the issue of 
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its congressional 
directive in expanding the use-of-minor enhancement for all 
defendants, the Fourth Circuit concluded that because “section 3B1.4 
is not at odds with Congress’[s] directive,” the Sentencing 
“Commission did not exceed its authority in promulgating the 
guideline.”105 Also noting that Congress gave significant discretion to 
the Sentencing Commission to formulate guidelines, and recognizing 
the Sentencing Commission’s expertise in sentencing matters, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that courts must defer to the Sentencing 
Commission’s interpretations of congressional directives if the 
interpretations are not “at odds” with the directive’s plain language.106 
Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey, the Fourth Circuit 
opined that “absent language in Congress’[s] directive limiting the 
enhancement only to defendants [twenty-one] years of age or older, 
section 3B1.4 is not at odds with the directive, and the [Sentencing] 
Commission was within its discretion to broaden the category of 
defendants eligible for the sentence enhancement.”107 According to 
the Fourth Circuit’s reading of the plain language of the directive, 
Congress simply intended to require the Sentencing Commission to 
ensure that defendants at least twenty-one years old who use a minor 
in committing a federal offense receive the sentence enhancement, 
and the Sentencing Commission complied with this directive.108 The 
Fourth Circuit explained that the Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding in 
Butler “failed to appreciate that because Congress did not direct that 
only defendants over age [twenty-one] receive the sentence 
enhancement, it actually did not require the [Sentencing] Commission 
to limit the application of section 3B1.4 to defendants of a certain 
 
 102.  See United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 103.  Id. at 512. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 513 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 106.  Id. at 512 (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)). 
 107.  Id. at 513 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 
857 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 108.  See id.  
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age.”109 The court was not the least bit concerned by the Sentencing 
Commission’s decision to expand the scope of the directive to provide 
the same enhancement for every defendant, regardless of age.110 
The Tenth Circuit further expanded the circuit split in favor of 
concluding that the Sentencing Commission had acted within its 
congressionally delegated authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. In 
United States v. Kravchuk, Ivan Kravchuk was convicted of theft from 
an automatic teller machine committed when he was eighteen years 
old.111 To commit the federal offense, Kravchuk had used a “gang” of 
minor coparticipants.112 At sentencing, the district court assessed a 
two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section 3B1.4 and 
sentenced Kravchuk to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment.113 
Kravchuk appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the 
congressional directive does not authorize sentence enhancements for 
defendants under the age of twenty-one.114 
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit presented the issue as “whether 
the sentencing enhancement under [section] 3B1.4 for use of a minor 
should be applied to defendants aged eighteen to twenty,” even 
though section 3B1.4 makes absolutely no reference to the age of the 
defendant.115 The court briefly—and briefly might be a charitably 
expansive term—recounted the decisions of the Fourth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits on the issue.116 Explaining that it must give “great 
deference” to the Sentencing Commission, the Tenth Circuit stated, 
“There is no direct conflict in the wording of [section 3B1.4] with 
Congress’s directive that it apply to defendants age twenty-one and 
over.”117 In addition to this singular statement on its rationale, the 
Tenth Circuit also stated that it agreed with “the reasoning of the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits.”118 Citing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Murphy and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey, the Tenth 
Circuit explained that those circuit courts upheld the validity of 
section 3B1.4 because although “Congress certainly intended the 
enhancement to apply to those over twenty-one,” the congressional 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See id. 
 111.  335 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 112.  Id. at 1152. 
 113.  See id. at 1151. 
 114.  See id. at 1158. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 1158–59. 
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“directive made no mention of any special policy for those under 
twenty-one” such that the “directive then does not conflict with the 
plain language of the guideline.”119 
The Tenth Circuit also relied on the Seventh Circuit’s 
explanation in Ramsey that Congress had implicitly approved section 
3B1.4 because Congress had an opportunity to review the guideline 
and chose “not to modify or otherwise to disapprove of the 
amendment extending liability for the use of minors to defendants 
under the age of twenty-one.”120 The Tenth Circuit made no effort to 
explain—or criticize—the Sixth Circuit’s contrary decision in Butler or 
discuss the relevance of the legislative history behind section 140008. 
Basing its decision mostly on the work of the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, the Tenth Circuit announced that it was joining its “sister 
circuits in finding that the Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement under 
[section] 3B1.4 for the use of a minor may be applied to defendants 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.”121 
 
 119.  Id. at 1158 (citing United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 512–13 (4th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 120.  Id. (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 858). 
 121.  Id. at 1151; In 2008, the Tenth Circuit again confronted section 3B1.4’s use-of-
minor enhancement, this time involving a defendant who began using his minor girlfriend 
to commit a federal offense when the defendant was also a minor: 
Defendant–Appellee Louiz Pena-Hermosillo started dealing drugs in 2001 at the 
age of sixteen. Around this time, he began living with Ms. Janae Kelly, who was 
twelve. She gave birth to Mr. Pena–Hermosillo’s child just after her fourteenth 
birthday. She began to perform drug-selling activities a month before the child 
was born, in April 2003. From that time until Mr. Pena–Hermosillo was arrested 
two years later, Ms. Kelly sold cocaine and methamphetamine and made 
between thirty and forty trips to Utah and an unstated number of trips to 
Colorado to deliver money and retrieve drugs. 
United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1109 (10th Cir. 2008). The defendant, 
who “was three and a half years older than” his girlfriend, used her to make drug-running 
trips since she was thirteen, and his use of her “continued for more than a year and a half 
after his eighteenth birthday.” Id. at 1114. Confronted with the argument that section 
3B1.4 does not apply to defendants under the age of eighteen who use minors to commit 
crimes, the Tenth Circuit avoided the issue by explaining that “for more than a year and a 
half, including most of the conduct on which the government relies, [the defendant] was 
eighteen or older.” Id. at 1115. Notwithstanding the court’s holding that section 3B1.4 
applies to defendants at least eighteen years of age, which simply followed circuit 
precedent from Kravchuk, 335 F.3d at 1158 (holding that section “3B1.4 is valid as applied 
to defendants aged eighteen to twenty”), the court curiously explained that “the three and 
a half year differences in their ages is surely large enough to satisfy the nonproximity 
requirement, if there is one.” Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d at 1115. Finally, the court pointed 
out that “the defendant was a junior in high school when [his girlfriend] was still in seventh 
grade,” which “is a large enough difference in ages to enable him to take advantage of 
her.” Id. at 1115—16.  Even though the Tenth Circuit simply followed circuit precedent in 
holding that section 3B1.4 applied to a defendant at least eighteen, the court displayed 
some concern that the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of section 3B1.4 without 
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Last but not least, the Eighth Circuit expanded the circuit split to 
four-to-one in favor of deciding that the Sentencing Commission had 
acted within its congressionally delegated authority in promulgating 
section 3B1.4 to apply a use-of-minor enhancement to any defendant 
regardless of age. In United States v. Wingate, Peter Wingate pleaded 
guilty to an armed robbery of a bank.122 As part of his robbery scheme, 
Wingate enlisted the assistance of two minors, one age seventeen and 
the other age sixteen.123 Even though Wingate was only eighteen years 
old when he robbed the bank, the district court assessed a two-level 
enhancement under section 3B1.4 for using a minor to commit the 
bank robbery, which resulted in a sentence of seventy-eight months’ 
imprisonment.124 Wingate appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that 
“the enhancement for use of a minor under section 3B1.4 exceeds [the 
Sentencing Commission’s] authorizing legislation and does not apply 
to a defendant under twenty-one years of age.”125 
Acknowledging the Sentencing Commission’s discretion and 
sentencing expertise, the Eighth Circuit explained that “section 
3B1.4’s wording does not directly conflict with the plain language of 
Congress’s directive, which requires the enhancement apply to 
defendants age twenty-one and over.”126 The Eighth Circuit concluded 
that section 3B1.4 literally “encompassed Congress’s directive 
because . . . defendants over age twenty-one will [still] receive the 
enhancement.”127 In the court’s view, the expanded enhancement 
under section 3B1.4 “merely extends the application to defendants 
under age twenty-one.”128 Finally, the court reasoned that “[a]lthough 
Congress stated the guideline ‘shall’ apply to defendants over twenty-
one years old, the guideline does not automatically exclude its 
application to those under age twenty-one.”129 The Eighth Circuit 
declared, “We join the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in holding 
 
age restrictions might conflict with Congress’s directive. See id. at 1115 (“We need not 
resolve whether [the] legislative history [behind the congressional directive that makes the 
defendant’s age relevant] prevails over the plain language of the Guideline [which makes 
age irrelevant.”). 
 122.  369 F.3d 1028, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion reinstated , 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 
2005). 
 123.  See id. 
 124.  See id. at 1030. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 1031. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 858 (7th. Cir. 2001)). 
 129.  Id. 
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section 3B1.4 is not contrary to the Congressional directive, and 
section 3B1.4 validly applies to defendants under age twenty-one.”130 
In an apparent mix-up in identifying recently decided circuit 
precedent, another Eighth Circuit panel also fully addressed the 
validity of section 3B1.4 just six weeks after Wingate was decided.131 In 
United States v. Ramirez, Robert Ramirez pleaded guilty to 
manufacturing methamphetamine when he was nineteen years old.132 
Because Ramirez had used several minors to commit the federal 
offense, the district court applied a two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement and sentenced Ramirez to ninety-three months’ 
imprisonment.133 Before the Eighth Circuit, Ramirez argued “that 
because he was only nineteen years old at the time of sentencing he 
was not subject to an upward adjustment for his use of minors to 
commit a crime” because “the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 
authority in its decision to apply [section] 3B1.4 to those under the age 
of twenty-one.”134 Providing an extended recitation of the reasoning 
employed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, the Eighth 
Circuit held “that the Sentencing Commission did not exceed the 
scope of its delegated authority when it promulgated [section] 3B1.4 
to include all defendants, regardless of age,” because section “3B1.4 is 
not ‘at odds’ with Congress’s directive.”135 The Eighth Circuit had 
(again) rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Butler and announced 
 
 130.  Id. at 1032. 
 131.  In United States v. Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit made the following telling 
statement that indicated that the panel that issued the decision was apparently unaware of 
the Wingate panel’s prior decision on the section 3B1.4 issue until the panel actually went 
to issue its opinion:  
We note that on June 2, 2004, another Eighth Circuit panel handed down an 
opinion addressing this same issue. Our conclusion in the current matter is 
consistent with the decision of the Wingate panel. When read together, the two 
opinions thoroughly address this court’s position on the scope of the Sentencing 
Commission’s delegated authority in relation to [section] 3B1.4. 
376 F.3d 785, 788 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Had the Eighth Circuit panel in 
Ramirez been aware of the Wingate panel’s prior decision, then the Ramirez panel would 
have simply cited Wingate as controlling on the section 3B1.4 issue. The Ramirez panel’s 
apparent mix-up in not identifying prior circuit precedent is telling in that two more federal 
judges—the Ramirez panel of judges less Judge Heaney, as discussed in the text below—
lined up behind the viewpoint that the Sentencing Commission did not exceed its authority 
in making the age of the defendant and the proximity in age between the defendant and 
the minor wholly irrelevant for federal sentencing purposes. 
 132.  See id. at 786. 
 133.  See id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 787–88. 
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that it had joined “the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth[,] and Eleventh 
Circuits.”136 
In a companion case to Ramirez that relied on the holdings in 
both Wingate and Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit again rejected a 
challenge to the validity of the expanded use-of-minor enhancement 
under section 3B1.4.137 In United States v. Harris, nineteen-year-old 
Kody Harris used his seventeen-year-old girlfriend to purchase 
substances used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.138 Because 
Harris had used a minor to commit a federal offense, the district court 
applied a two-level enhancement under section 3B1.4 and sentenced 
Harris to 188 months’ imprisonment.139 Noting that the Eighth Circuit 
had already squarely addressed the validity of section 3B1.4 and had 
held “that the guideline promulgated by the [Sentencing] Commission 
is not contrary to Congress’s directive,” the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
Harris’s sentence.140 
Had the Ramirez panel decided the section 3B1.4 issue before the 
Wingate panel, however, the Eighth Circuit more than likely would 
have joined the Sixth Circuit as having been unable to muster a 
unanimous panel opinion. In a reluctant concurrence based on 
binding circuit precedent, Judge Heaney separately wrote in Ramirez, 
“I believe the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by 
applying [section] 3B1.4 to defendants less than twenty-one years of 
age because Congress directed that the enhancement should apply 
only to those twenty-one and over.”141 For support, Judge Heaney 
found persuasive the legislative history that Congress had “considered 
and rejected a directive that would apply the enhancement to all 
defendants eighteen and over, instead settling on one that would 
apply only to those twenty-one and over.”142 Because the Eighth 
Circuit had “decided [in Wingate] that the [Sentencing] Commission 
 
 136.  Id. As explained in note 73, the Eighth Circuit’s proclamation that the Eleventh 
Circuit had decided the section 3B1.4 issue is inaccurate. See supra note 73 (explaining how 
both the Sixth Circuit in Borkowski and the Eighth Circuit in Ramirez erroneously assert 
that the Eleventh Circuit has squarely addressed the issue of whether the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 without an age 
restriction). 
 137.  See United States v. Harris, 390 F.3d 572, 572–73 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 138.  Id. at 572. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 573–74. 
 141.  Ramirez, 376 F.3d at 788–89 (Heaney, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 142.  Id. at 789 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
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was within its authority to promulgate the enhancement as it is,” 
Judge Heaney concurred.143 
C. New York District Court Held that the Sentencing Commission 
Exceeded Congressional Authority in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 
by Making It Apply to Defendants Who Are Younger than the 
Minors Used in Committing the Federal Offense 
Of the five federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of 
whether the Sentencing Commission had the authority to promulgate 
section 3B1.4 without age restrictions for defendants, all of those 
courts confronted defendants who were not yet twenty-one years old 
but were still adults over the age of eighteen. A federal district court 
in New York confronted a case where the defendant was a minor 
himself when he used other minors to commit a federal offense. In 
United States v. Delarosa, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York issued an interesting unpublished 
opinion that sentenced David Delarosa to 188 months’ imprisonment 
for conspiring to distribute and possessing with the intent to distribute 
heroin.144 As a seventeen-year old minor, Delarosa had assumed a 
leadership role of a criminal heroin organization operating out of the 
Bronx in New York.145 As a leader of this drug operation, Delarosa 
employed numerous minor co-conspirators, many, if not all, of whom 
were actually older than Delarosa.146 Apparently, Delarosa was able to 
assume the leadership role despite his age because the criminal 
enterprise had been “run by Delarosa’s father, uncles, and older 
brother until their arrests.”147 
While prosecutors sought a two-level use-of-minor enhancement, 
Delarosa countered that such an enhancement was inappropriate 
“because (1) Congress did not empower the Sentencing Commission 
to make the adjustment applicable to defendants who are themselves 
under twenty-one years of age, and (2) because Delarosa was 
apparently the youngest member of the conspiracy.”148 The district 
court recognized that its appellate court, the Second Circuit, had “not 
yet addressed the question whether the adjustment for use of a minor 
 
 143.  Id. (citing United States v. Wingate, 369 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion 
reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
 144.  No. 04 CR. 424-1 (RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 145.  See id. at *2. 
 146.  See id. at *4. 
 147.  Id. at *2. 
 148.  Id. at *3–4. 
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should apply to cases in which the defendant is less than twenty-one 
years of age.”149 The district court next acknowledged the federal 
circuit split: 
[T]he Sixth Circuit has held that the enhancement may not be 
applied to defendants under the age of twenty-one because the 
Sentencing Commission “failed to comport with a clear 
Congressional directive,” . . . while the Fourth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits have concluded that the Guideline’s elimination 
of the age requirement was a permissible interpretation of 
Congress’[s] intent.150 
Although the district court found “the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning” 
in Butler “compelling,” the court found it unnecessary “to choose 
sides in this circuit split.”151 The district court deemed it significant that 
the decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits all “involved defendants who, though under the age of 
twenty-one, were over the age of eighteen, and, even more 
significantly, were older than the minors whose involvement provided 
the basis for the enhancements.”152 According to the district court, 
those facts “stand in stark contrast to the facts of [Delarosa’s] case, 
involving a defendant who was a minor himself . . . and was apparently 
younger than all of the other minors involved in the offense.”153 
Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey that “detailed 
extensively” the Crime Bill’s legislative history, the district court 
concluded, “Congress never intended the enhancement to apply to a 
defendant who was younger than the minors he recruited.”154 
Explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s concern in Butler “that the 
existence of an age differential allows an older, adult party to 
influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous behavior”155 was 
not present in Delarosa’s case, the district court held that applying 
section 3B1.4 to Delarosa “would impermissibly conflict with a clear 
 
 149.  Id. at *5. 
 150.  Id. (citing United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2004), United 
States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2003), United States v. Murphy, 254 
F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001), United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
Although the Delarosa court never explicitly listed the Eighth Circuit as agreeing with the 
Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, it cited the Eighth Circuit’s Ramirez case with its 
cohorts. See id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857–58). 
 155.  Id. (citing United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J., 
concurring)). 
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congressional directive.”156 Based on this reasoning, the district court 
did not apply a two-level use-of-minor enhancement to Delarosa’s 
sentence.157 
D. Sentencing Disparities Will Continue Until the Supreme Court 
Decides Whether the Sentencing Commission Exceeded Its 
Authority in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 Without an Age 
Restriction 
This Article contends that only the Sixth Circuit and the New 
York District Court have correctly decided that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority by defying the clear congressional 
directive to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement that made the 
age of the defendant relevant for sentencing purposes. To be sure, the 
issue of the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 
3B1.4 without age restrictions has vexed numerous courts and is still 
alive and well. For example, in a 2010 case out of Iowa, twenty-year 
old Travis Hawkins used a seventeen-year old minor to try to steal a 
diamond ring in a nighttime robbery.158 Hawkins pleaded guilty to 
possessing a sawed-off shotgun and a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number in connection with the robbery.159 Applying a two-level 
use-of-minor enhancement, the district court calculated a total offense 
level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, leaving a Guidelines 
range of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment.160 The district court 
sentenced Hawkins to 121 months in prison.161 On appeal, Hawkins 
argued that the Eighth Circuit should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s holding 
in Butler “that the use-of-a-minor enhancement does not apply to 
defendants who committed their crimes when less than twenty-one 
years old.”162 Based on the binding precedent of United States v. 
Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit rejected Hawkins’s argument.163 
The application of the two-level use-of-minor enhancement 
significantly increased Hawkins’s punishment. If the two-level 
enhancement had not been applied, Hawkins’s offense level would 
have been 30. With an offense level of 30 and a criminal history 
 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  See id. 
 158.  See United States v. Jones, 612 F.3d 1040, 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 159.  See id. at 1043. 
 160.  See id. at 1043–44. 
 161.  Id. at 1044. 
 162.  Id. at 1048 (citing United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 163.  See id. (citing United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
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category of I, the guideline’s sentencing range would have been 
between 97 and 121 months’ imprisonment.164 As can readily be seen, 
Hawkins was subject to two additional years in prison based on the 
application of the use-of-minor enhancement. The proper resolution 
of this issue matters. 
Additionally, a recent case in Tennessee, which falls in the Sixth 
Circuit, further revealed that federal courts are still struggling with 
this issue, even when circuit precedent already controls the issue. 
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Butler that section 3B1.4 cannot 
be applied to defendants younger than twenty-one years of age,165 the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee 
still apparently applied a use-of-minor enhancement to Edgar 
Sanchez, who was eighteen years old when he used two minors to sell 
drugs.166 
Until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split and decides 
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in 
promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement that made the age of a 
defendant wholly irrelevant, sentencing disparities will continue to 
exist for defendants who use minors to commit federal offenses 
depending on where they commit the offenses. Additionally, federal 
courts will continue to apply use-of-minor enhancements to increase 
the sentences of defendants under the age of twenty-one (and even 
under the age of eighteen, for that matter). By providing in-depth 
analysis of the limited scope of the Sentencing Commission’s authority 
to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement under the congressional 
directive, this Article allows federal courts to adopt the no-authority 
option by providing a strong analytical framework to ensure that only 
adult defendants at least twenty-one years of age receive the use-of-
minor enhancement. 
 
 164.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2011). 
 165.  See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849–51 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 166.  See Brief of Defendant–Appellant at 8, United States v. Sanchez, 2009 WL 
2390037 (July 24, 2009) (No. 08-6068). 
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V. BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COMMISSION IGNORED A CLEAR 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVE AND DEFIED CONGRESS’S INTENT BY 
ELIMINATING AGE RESTRICTIONS FROM THE USE-OF-MINOR 
ENHANCEMENT, DISTRICT COURTS CAN UTILIZE THE NO-
AUTHORITY OPTION TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM 
In deciding whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 
congressional authority in promulgating section 3B1.4, courts must 
first understand the nature and scope of the Sentencing Commission’s 
authority. Congress created the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate guidelines to be used by district courts when sentencing 
defendants convicted of federal offenses.167 Congress requires that the 
Sentencing Commission only promulgate guidelines that are 
“consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute.”168 
Federal courts have recognized that the Sentencing Commission 
enjoys broad discretion in promulgating guidelines, even though such 
a view was challenged shortly after Congress created the Sentencing 
Commission. In Mistretta v. United States, a criminal defendant argued 
that the Guidelines are unconstitutional because the establishment of 
“the Sentencing Commission was constituted in violation of the 
established doctrine of separation of powers, and that Congress 
delegated excessive authority to the [Sentencing] Commission to 
structure the Guidelines.”169 In holding the Guidelines constitutional, 
the Supreme Court did not dispute that Congress had given 
“significant discretion” to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
guidelines.170 The Court made clear, however, that “the [Sentencing] 
Commission is fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or 
amend any or all of the Guidelines as it sees fit either within the 180-
day waiting period . . . or at any time.”171 
Although Congress acted within its constitutional authority in 
granting the Sentencing Commission significant discretion to 
 
 167.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2000). 
 168.  Id. § 994(a). 
 169.  488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989). 
 170.  See id. at 377. John Locke expressed a different opinion in his Two Treatises of 
Government:  
The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive 
voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant 
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the 
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and 
place it in other hands. 
JOHN LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government § 141 (10th ed. 2005). 
 171.  See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393–94. 
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promulgate guidelines, Congress did not bless the Sentencing 
Commission with “unbounded discretion.”172 Indeed, the Sentencing 
Commission must always “bow to the specific directives of 
Congress.”173 To determine whether a guideline accurately carries out 
congressional intent, courts must review the plain language of a 
congressional directive;174 if a guideline is “at odds” with the plain 
language, the guideline fails.175 
Importantly, in asking whether the Sentencing Commission 
exceeded its authority in promulgating a guideline pursuant to the 
plain language of a congressional directive, courts “do not start from 
the premise that [Congress’s] language is imprecise.”176 The opposite is 
true—courts must assume that when Congress drafts legislation, 
“Congress said what it meant.”177 
Thus, courts must ask whether “Congress said what it meant” 
when it directed the Sentencing Commission to provide an 
enhancement for defendants twenty-one years of age or older who use 
minors to commit federal offenses and to consider the proximity in 
ages between the defendant and minor. Congress’s plain language 
does not stand naked, however, as there are other indicators 
expressing Congress’s intent. The plain language of Congress’s 
directive, the legislative history behind the directive, and the context 
in which the directive was created demonstrate that “Congress said 
what it meant”—the age of the defendant who uses a minor to commit 
a federal offense matters. Congress’s focus on age was not excess and 
useless verbiage. 
A. The Sentencing Commission Performed Linguistic Gymnastics to 
Conclude that the Congressional Directive’s Plain Language Was 
Ambiguous as to Congress’s Intent to Make the Age of a 
Defendant Relevant for Purposes of the Use-of-Minor 
Enhancement 
After reading Parts I through III of this Article, did you believe 
that the Sentencing Commission complied with the congressional 
directive to enhance the sentences of defendants at least twenty-one 
years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses? Did you at 
 
 172.  See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753 (1997). 
 173.  Id. at 757. 
 174.  See id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
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least conclude that Congress intended age to be a relevant sentencing 
factor for purposes of the use-of-minor enhancement? As you studied 
Part IV’s discussion of the reasoning behind the decisions of the 
federal courts that have addressed this issue, which were more 
persuasive on the issue of whether section 3B1.4 is at odds with the 
congressional directive? No matter where you stand at this point, this 
part of the Article expounds on the reasons why the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating a use-of-minor 
enhancement that makes the age of the defendant wholly irrelevant. 
The first order of business is to compare the plain language that 
Congress used to direct the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a 
use-of-minor enhancement for defendants at least twenty-one years 
old with the Sentencing Commission’s “slightly broader” guideline 
that contains absolutely no reference to the age of the defendant. 
Does the plain language used by Congress in its directive to the 
Sentencing Commission reflect clear or ambiguous guidance on 
Congress’s intent to make the age of defendants relevant for 
sentencing purposes? If the answer is that Congress clearly intended 
to make the defendant’s age a relevant factor in sentencing, then 
section 3B1.4’s wholesale elimination of an age restriction is at odds 
with the congressional directive. If, on the other hand, Congress failed 
to demonstrate its intent to make a defendant’s age a relevant 
sentencing factor, then the Sentencing Commission acted within its 
authority in making the age of the defendant irrelevant for sentencing 
purposes. 
Congress explicitly directed the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate a guideline to enhance the sentence for defendants who 
are at least twenty-one years of age who use minors under the age of 
eighteen to commit a federal offense. Thus, Congress used age 
restrictions twice in the directive itself, once to describe the age of the 
defendant subject to the enhancement and once to describe the age of 
the minor used in the offense. The ages of the defendant and the 
minor are not the only examples of Congress’s plain language 
expressing the importance of age restrictions. Congress also explicitly 
directed the Sentencing Commission to consider the difference in the 
ages between the adult defendant and the minor used. Admitting that 
it promulgated a use-of-minor enhancement in a “slightly broader 
form,” the Sentencing Commission eviscerated any age requirement 
for defendants to receive an enhancement. Under section 3B1.4’s use-
of-minor enhancement, the age of the defendant is wholly irrelevant, 
as is the proximity in age between the defendant and the minor used 
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to commit the offense. The result is that every defendant—no matter 
how old or how young—will receive the same two-level sentence 
enhancement for using a minor to commit a federal offense. For 
example, a forty-year-old adult who uses a seventeen-year-old minor 
receives the same two-level enhancement as an eighteen-year-old 
defendant who uses a seventeen-year-old minor who is two or three 
days younger than the defendant. Did Congress intend that the ages 
of these two defendants—and the proximity in ages between the 
defendants and minors—would be wholly irrelevant such that each 
defendant receives the same enhancement? Additionally, a defendant 
who is the same age as—or younger than—the minor used will also 
receive the same two-level sentence enhancement as a defendant who 
is much older than the minor he used. Do these results comply with 
Congress’s directive? Are they at odds with Congress’s intent?178 
In simply reviewing the plain language of the directive, federal 
courts have been unable to agree on whether the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded congressional authority in promulgating 
section 3B1.4. On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit announced that it 
could “not conceive of a clearer example than that presented here 
where the [Sentencing] Commission has so flatly ignored a clear 
[c]ongressional directive” as when it “simply removed the age 
restriction . . . lock, stock[,] and barrel.”179 Importantly, the Sixth 
Circuit was unanimous in concluding that the Sentencing Commission 
had completely ignored a clear congressional directive, at least when 
the three judges on the panel looked only at the plain language of the 
directive. Even Judge Clay, in his dissent in Butler, wrote, “At first 
blush, it appears . . . that Congress intended—and provided in 
unambiguous terms—for sentence enhancement for solicitation of a 
minor to commit crime [sic] only for defendants age 21 and older.”180 
And Judge Clay was hardly lukewarm in his conclusion that Congress 
unequivocally and clearly directed the Sentencing Commission to 
 
 178.  Consider the admittedly troubling crime of child pornography as a possible 
illustration of comparing two defendants engaged in the same conduct to explore whether 
Congress intended that both defendants would receive the same use-of-minor 
enhancement. First, seventeen-year-old A uses his sixteen-year-old brother to tape sexual 
relations between two minors. Second, fifty-year-old adult B uses a seventeen-year-old 
minor to tape sexual relations between two minors. Assuming that both A and B 
committed federal offenses and used minors to do so, did Congress intend that both A and 
B would receive the same two-level sentence enhancement? Did Congress express its 
intent that the age of the two defendants and the proximity in age between them and the 
minors used should be irrelevant for sentencing purposes? 
 179.  United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 850 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 180.  Id. at 845 (Clay, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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enhance sentences only for defendants at least twenty-one years old, 
proclaiming, “A clearer expression of congressional intent is 
unimaginable.”181 In addition to the Butler panel’s unanimous 
conclusion as to the clarity of congressional intent gleaned from the 
plain language of the congressional directive, Judge Heaney of the 
Eighth Circuit also concluded that Congress’s intent was that only 
defendants at least twenty-one years of age would receive a use-of-
minor enhancement.182 Finally, although the federal district court in 
Delarosa deemed it unnecessary “to choose sides in this circuit split” 
based on what the court deemed to be the unique facts of the case in 
which the defendant was actually younger than the minors used, the 
court still found “the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning” in Butler 
“compelling.”183 
Four circuits, on the other hand, have reached the opposite 
conclusion. The Seventh Circuit—later joined by the Fourth, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits—concluded that Congress’s only expression of 
intent was that defendants twenty-one years of age or older must 
receive the enhancement.184 As long as the Sentencing Commission 
promulgated an enhancement that ensured that those defendants 
would receive an enhancement, the Seventh Circuit was content to 
conclude that anything else that the Sentencing Commission did 
would also reflect congressional intent. This conclusion encompassed 
the Sentencing Commission’s ultimate expansion of the use-of-minor 
enhancement to include every defendant, as opposed to defendants of 
a certain age, regardless of the proximity in age between the 
 
 181.  Id. Perhaps tellingly, a law student’s published comment on section 3B1.4 
expressed a very straightforward reading of Congress’s intent to focus the use-of-minor 
enhancement only on adults who corrupt minors: “In order to deter adult criminals from 
committing crimes with the assistance of minors, the United States Sentencing Commission 
adopted section 3B1.4 of the [Guidelines]. Section 3B1.4 is a sentencing enhancement 
penalty for adults who use minors to commit a crime.” John J. DiChello Jr., Comment, 
Crossing Textualist Paths: An Analysis of the Proper Textualist Interpretation of “Use” 
Under Section 3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines for “Using” a Minor To 
Commit a Crime, 107 DICK. L. REV. 359, 360 (2002) (emphasis added). Indeed, the most 
basic reading of the plain language of the congressional directive cries out that Congress 
focused its intent on enhancing sentences for adult criminals who corrupt minors by using 
them to commit federal offenses. 
 182.  See United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., 
concurring). 
 183.  United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 184.  See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2001). Curiously, the 
Seventh Circuit expressed skepticism that, without considering Congress’s failure to reject 
the proposed guideline during the review period, the Sentencing Commission gave 
“sufficient weight to the congressional directive.” Id. at 858. 
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defendant and the minor. In a much more bold opinion on the scope 
of the Sentencing Commission’s discretion to comply with the 
congressional directive, the Fourth Circuit suggested that the only way 
that Congress could have limited the Sentencing Commission’s 
discretion was by using the word only in front of the age of twenty-
one.185 
There is no doubt that the Sentencing Commission complied with 
the plain language of the congressional directive to the extent that 
defendants who are at least twenty-one years old will receive a use-of-
minor enhancement under section 3B1.4 (which all of them will). 
Everyone can agree on that. It does not likewise logically follow that 
the Seventh Circuit is correct in then concluding that stripping any 
relevance of age is thus not “at odds” with Congress’s directive, such 
that the Sentencing Commission enjoyed unbridled and limitless 
discretion “to enlarge the category of defendants to whom” the 
enhancement would apply.186 Words must have meaning, and 
Congress’s repeated references to age must be given effect. 
Although courts undoubtedly must give some deference to the 
Sentencing Commission as long as reasonable minds can differ on 
congressional intent, no deference is allowed if reasonable minds 
cannot differ. Instead of simply rehashing the arguments in terms of 
section 3B1.4’s wholesale elimination of the relevance of a 
defendant’s age, perhaps the issue can be enlightened by inverting and 
testing it in changing circumstances to challenge the conclusion that as 
long as a use-of-minor enhancement includes the group of defendants 
targeted by Congress (i.e., defendants at least twenty-one years old), 
then the guideline will not be at odds with congressional intent no 
matter who else the enhancement captures in its net. 
If the twenty-one year old age restriction and the age proximity 
requirement used by Congress simply required the Sentencing 
Commission to ensure that defendants at least twenty-one years old 
received enhancements but in no way limited the Sentencing 
Commission from abrogating any relevance of age, then the same 
conclusion should result regardless of the ages that Congress actually 
used to describe defendants or minors. Presumably, both ages either 
matter or they do not. If the Sentencing Commission was free to 
 
 185.  See United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Ramsey, 
237 F.3d at 857). This concentrated and narrow reading of Congress’s plain language seems 
to turn the tables on who is granting authority to whom, where the presumption seems to 
be that the Sentencing Commission has boundless authority unless Congress tightly focuses 
every word in its desire to limit the Sentencing Commission’s authority. 
 186.  Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857. 
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entirely delete the twenty-one year old age restriction and the 
proximity in age requirement, then it likewise would have been free to 
discard any other age restriction, as long as defendants over the age of 
twenty-one were still given the enhancement. If the Sentencing 
Commission had promulgated an enhancement for any defendant who 
uses any person, regardless of age, to commit a crime, would this 
guideline comply with the congressional directive? A few hypothetical 
situations might clarify this point. 
Assume that in carrying out Congress’s intent as seen in the 
Crime Bill’s directive, the Sentencing Commission promulgated a use-
of-a-person enhancement instead of a use-of-minor enhancement. 
This use-of-a-person enhancement applied a two-level enhancement 
to any person who uses another person to commit a federal offense. If 
an eighty-five year old resident of a nursing home used another 
eighty-five year old resident of the nursing home to commit a federal 
offense, should a two-level use-of-a-person enhancement be applied? 
If the source of the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate 
such an enhancement is the congressional directive to promulgate a 
use-of-minor enhancement, it would seem laughable to conclude that 
applying such an enhancement to an eighty-five year old person who 
uses another eighty-five year old person followed Congress’s intent. 
Simply brushing off this expansion of the Sentencing Commission’s 
authority by saying that at least defendants over the age of twenty-one 
who use minors under the age of eighteen would still receive a use-of-
minor enhancement seems misplaced. But if the Sentencing 
Commission has the authority to wholly discard the relevance of the 
defendant’s age for purposes of the use-of-minor enhancement, then it 
would seem likewise allowable for the Sentencing Commission to 
disregard the class of individuals that Congress sought to protect—
minors—in order to protect everyone else. At some point, such 
interpretations render Congress’s expressed intent meaningless and 
allow for unlimited expansion of the Sentencing Commission’s 
authority in the face of Congress’s limitations on that authority. 
What if the Sentencing Commission had kept the age restriction 
for defendants as directed by Congress (twenty-one), but had only 
changed the age of the person used in the commission of the federal 
offense? Assume that the Sentencing Commission had promulgated a 
guideline that would enhance sentences for adult defendants at least 
twenty-one years of age who use anyone under the age of twenty-five 
(rather than minors under the age of eighteen) to commit a federal 
offense. Undoubtedly, the entire class of defendants who use minors 
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under the age of eighteen would still receive an enhancement. Is it fair 
to conclude that Congress’s only intent was to ensure that this class of 
defendants received the enhancement? What relevance, if any, should 
be given to the age of the person used in the offense—in Congress’s 
decision, minors—if the ages of the defendants and the proximity in 
the ages between the defendant and the minor have been declared to 
be absolutely irrelevant? Once courts conclude that Congress’s 
references to the age of the defendant and the proximity in ages 
between defendants and minors have no meaning—even though 
Congress specifically used defendants at least twenty-one years old 
and deemed as relevant the proximity in age between the defendant 
and the minor—then the age of the person used in the offense 
likewise could have no meaning. Thus, we would be led to believe that 
even though Congress specifically sought to protect minors under the 
age of eighteen from being used to commit crimes—as seen by 
Congress’s references to minors four times in the directive and in the 
directive’s title—the only true expression of congressional intent was 
that any defendant who uses a minor would receive a use-of-minor 
enhancement. 
As another example, what if Congress had directed the 
Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences for defendants at least 
sixty years of age who use minors under the age of twelve and to also 
consider the proximity in ages between the defendants and the 
minors? According to the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits, if the Sentencing Commission then promulgated the current 
section 3B1.4 that applies enhancements to all defendants who use 
minors under the age of eighteen years, that guideline would not be at 
odds with the congressional directive. These circuit courts would be 
required to reach that holding because (1) nothing in the directive 
indicates that only defendants at least sixty years old should receive an 
enhancement, (2) nothing in the directive indicates that only the use 
of minors under twelve years of age should result in an enhancement, 
(3) the guideline simply expands the class of defendants to whom the 
enhancement would apply, and (4) the guideline ensures that those 
defendants at least age sixty who use minors under the age of twelve 
would receive the enhancement. Thus, even a fifteen-year-old 
defendant who uses a seventeen-year-old minor would receive a 
sentence enhancement. Would that result be at odds with the 
congressional directive? Such results seem nonsensical given 
Congress’s focus on the ages of adult defendants—sixty—and the 
minors used—twelve. When you also consider that Congress 
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specifically directed the Sentencing Commission to consider the age 
proximity between the defendant and minor, common sense seems to 
dictate that grand legal analysis is not required to recognize that the 
ages of the defendant and minor must remain relevant for purposes of 
sentence enhancements. 
Similarly, what if Congress had directed the Sentencing 
Commission to enhance the sentence of any defendant who uses a 
minor who is at least half the age of the defendant and further 
instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider the proximity in 
age between the defendant and the minor used when considering an 
enhancement? If the Sentencing Commission then promulgated a 
guideline like section 3B1.4 without any age restrictions for 
defendants, the federal circuit courts that have blessed section 3B1.4 
would be hard pressed to rationally explain why they would not be 
bound to conclude that the Sentencing Commission again acted within 
its authority. This result should follow particularly because all of the 
defendants identified by Congress would still receive a sentence 
enhancement and Congress did not sufficiently demonstrate that only 
those defendants should receive an enhancement. But this leap of 
faith seems to require a suspension of disbelief to pull off, let alone 
the wholesale elimination of any critical legal analysis. 
Even though changing the ages used by Congress seems 
persuasive to show the unreasonableness of the Sentencing 
Commission’s elimination of the relevance of Congress’s age 
restrictions for defendants, we should return to the actual use-of-
minor enhancement in section 3B1.4 and compare it to congressional 
intent. Creating a few more scenarios might help determine whether 
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement squares with Congress’s 
directive. What if twins commit a federal offense on their eighteenth 
birthday at the urging of one of them? As it turns out, the older or 
first-born twin, T1, actually recruited the younger or second-born 
twin, T2, to help T1 commit the offense. It also turns out that although 
T1 was eighteen years old at the time that the offense was committed, 
T2 was not technically eighteen because the crime was committed 
after the time of T1’s birth but before the time of T2’s birth. Are the 
ages of the twins relevant for sentencing purposes or did Congress 
intend that T1 would receive a use-of-minor enhancement? 
To press this line of reasoning further, what if a sixteen-year-old 
defendant used a seventeen-year-old minor to commit a federal 
offense? What if a seventeen-year-old defendant used a friend who 
was a few days older to commit a federal offense? To further illustrate 
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that the ages of the defendant and minor must be relevant, what if a 
twelve-year-old minor used a seventeen-year-old minor to commit a 
federal offense? Finally, in a scenario that reflects an actual federal 
case that challenged section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under 
the age of twenty-one, what if a seventeen-year-old defendant led a 
group of older, but still minor, participants to commit federal 
offenses? 
In every one of these scenarios, numerous circuit courts would be 
forced to conclude—or have already impliedly concluded—that 
nothing in Congress’s directive to the Sentencing Commission 
reflected its intent that these defendants should not receive a use-of-
minor enhancement in the same way that older adults would. Indeed, 
four circuit courts have already blessed the application of section 
3B1.4—which makes the age of the defendant irrelevant—to 
defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. Once a 
court blesses the Sentencing Commission’s authority to decrease the 
age of eligible defendants by three years, it becomes a difficult 
proposition to then determine at which particular age that discretion 
ends. 
The last scenario just described, as you may recall, recounts the 
facts of Delarosa.187 In that case, the district court deemed it significant 
that the decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits all “involved defendants who, though under the age of 
twenty-one, were over the age of eighteen, and, even more 
significantly, were older than the minors whose involvement provided 
the basis for the enhancements.”188 According to the district court, 
those facts “stand in stark contrast to the facts of [Delarosa’s] case, 
involving a defendant who was a minor himself . . . and was apparently 
younger than all of the other minors involved in the offense.”189 
Admitting that the age of the defendant and the proximity of the ages 
of the defendants and minors used must be relevant, the district court 
refused to apply section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to this 
young defendant.190 Given Congress’s commitment on three occasions 
within the directive to make the defendant’s age a relevant sentencing 
factor, the Delarosa opinion ensures that age remains a relevant 
sentencing factor regardless of the Sentencing Commission’s decision 
 
 187.  See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *2, 
4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 188.  Id. at *5.  
 189.  Id. 
 190.  See id. 
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to eliminate its relevance altogether. The Delarosa court gave no 
deference to the Sentencing Commission’s decision to enact a “slightly 
broader” use-of-minor enhancement. Because the Delarosa court’s 
analysis tracks Congress’s intent, it is difficult to criticize; instead, the 
opinion seems inherently correct. 
Tellingly, the Tenth Circuit might part ways with the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in cases like Delarosa that involve minor 
defendants. Somewhat surprisingly and without authority, the Tenth 
Circuit intimated that section 3B1.4 only applies to defendants who 
are themselves adults, concluding that the Sentencing Commission 
merely expanded the class of defendants from those over twenty-one 
years of age to those at least eighteen.191 In Kravchuk, the Tenth 
Circuit’s dicta that section 3B1.4 only applies to defendants at least 
eighteen years old would prohibit a minor defendant like Delarosa 
from receiving a use-of-minor enhancement. There is nothing in 
section 3B1.4 that makes the defendant’s age relevant for application 
of the two-level use-of-minor enhancement. Unfortunately, the Tenth 
Circuit did not explain why the Sentencing Commission had the 
authority to modify the twenty-one year age restriction for 
defendants, but it nonetheless lacked the authority to make it lower 
than the age of eighteen. At a minimum, the Tenth Circuit conceded 
that the age of the defendant must be relevant for sentencing purposes 
such that the Sentencing Commission acted without authority in 
promulgating an enhancement where the age of the defendant is 
wholly irrelevant.192 
 
 191.  See United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 192.  In United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, the Tenth Circuit conceded that there is 
“some support in the [Crime Bill’s] legislative history for the defendant’s argument” that 
section 3B1.4 should not apply to defendants who are minors who use other minors to 
commit federal offenses. 522 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008). The court acknowledged 
that the Sentencing Commission, in enacting section 3B1.4 pursuant to an express 
congressional directive, “included neither an age limitation [for defendants] nor any 
limitation based on proximity in ages” between the defendant and minor used. Id. But the 
court also understood that “Congress took no step to override” the Sentencing 
Commission’s decision to remove the relevance of the defendant’s age from the decision to 
apply a use-of-minor enhancement. Id. Even though the court did not need to decide the 
issue of whether section 3B1.4 applies to defendants under the age of eighteen because this 
particular defendant used a minor when the defendant was over eighteen (but started using 
the minor when the defendant was also a minor), the court still spent a few sentences 
explaining that there was “a large enough difference in ages to enable [the defendant] to 
take advantage of” the minor. Id. at 1115–16. Even though section 3B1.4 makes the age of 
the defendant and the proximity in age between the defendant and minor used entirely 
irrelevant for sentencing purposes, the Tenth Circuit again demonstrated that there is a 
conflict between Congress’s focus on the defendant’s age and the Sentencing Commission’s 
decision to make the defendant’s age absolutely irrelevant. No matter how much courts 
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The Sixth Circuit spent some time developing the theme that 
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to make age relevant 
for sentencing purposes. Calling section 3B1.4 “far more dramatic” 
than Congress’s directive, the Sixth Circuit predicted some of the 
foreseeable consequences of the Sentencing Commission’s decision to 
eliminate the relevance of age: “As this case demonstrates, without 
the age limit that Congress originally authorized, the guideline 
introduces a whole host of situations where defendants under age 
twenty-one can receive enhancements for engaging in criminal 
activities with youths of similar age, or perhaps even older than the 
defendants themselves.”193 Describing Congress’s age restriction as “a 
core aspect of that directive,” the Sixth Circuit explained that the 
twenty-one year old age restriction played a bright-line role in 
Congress’s directive.194 According to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation 
of congressional intent, Congress created the age restriction out of a 
“concern that the existence of an age differential allows an older, 
adult party to influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous 
behavior.”195 This interpretation tracks the directive’s plain language 
that requires the Sentencing Commission to promulgate an 
enhancement for defendants at least twenty-one years of age who use 
minors under the age of eighteen, and in doing so, to consider the age 
differences between the two. As will be shown in Part V.B., this 
determination that the focus of the directive is on minors who are 
corrupted by adults is consistent with the legislative history behind the 
congressional directive. 
Words must have meaning, or else plain language loses its ability 
to act as an indicator of intent. Courts engage in dangerous 
interpretations of congressional intent when they conclude that 
Congress’s words are ambiguous such that an agency like the 
Sentencing Commission, which only gets its powers and authority 
from Congress, has unbridled, bottomless discretion to eliminate 
words altogether from legislation. Three times within the directive 
itself Congress revealed its intent that age restrictions for defendants 
were an important part of its contemplated use-of-minor 
enhancement. Not only did Congress use the ages of twenty-one for 
 
wish to defer to the Sentencing Commission’s decision to promulgate section 3B1.4 in a 
“slightly broader form” without any age restrictions for defendants, courts still must 
confront cases in which the age of the defendant seems to be a glaring and obvious factor 
in sentencing, precisely as Congress instructed. 
 193.  United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
2011] BUT I’M NOT TWENTY-ONE YET 249 
defendants and less than eighteen for minors, Congress also made 
clear that the age differences between the two classes were important 
in meting out appropriate punishment. It is difficult to describe as 
reasonable the Sentencing Commission’s decision to create an 
enhancement that completely discards two of the three references to 
age. The result was that the Sentencing Commission made the 
considerations of a defendant’s age and the age differences between 
the defendant and minor wholly irrelevant for sentencing purposes. 
Given the directive’s plain language and considering the scenarios laid 
out above, Congress intended that age can be, should be, and is a 
relevant consideration in applying a use-of-minor enhancement.196 
As I conclude this part of the Article, I want to make clear that I 
am not contending that the Sentencing Commission had only one 
option—promulgating one use-of-minor enhancement for all 
defendants at least twenty-one years of age. Admittedly, the 
Sentencing Commission enjoys broad discretion when it comes to 
setting national sentencing policy as long as it does not abuse or 
exceed its authority by defying Congress’s intent. Consistent with the 
congressional directive to ensure that the defendant’s age is relevant 
for sentencing purposes, it might have been reasonable for the 
Sentencing Commission to increase the level of enhancement for 
defendants as the age disparity between defendants and minors 
increased. For example, the Sentencing Commission could have 
determined that a defendant at least forty years old who uses a minor 
under the age of twelve should receive a greater enhancement than a 
twenty-one year old adult who uses a seventeen-year-old minor. 
Additionally, as long as the Sentencing Commission carried out 
 
 196.  As can be expected from its title, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, prohibits age discrimination in employment. Id. § 623. 
However, the ADEA does not ban all age discrimination; it limits protection to individuals 
forty years of age or older. Id. § 631(a). In enacting the ADEA, Congress authorized the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to “issue such rules and regulations 
as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out [the ADEA], and [to] establish 
such reasonable exemptions to and from any or all provisions of [the ADEA] as it may find 
necessary and proper in the public interest.” Id. § 628. Although this admittedly is an 
apples-to-oranges comparison, no rational person could fathom the EEOC’s creating 
regulatory rights by interpreting the ADEA in a way that would allow persons under forty 
years of age to be able to claim age discrimination under the ADEA. Congress did not 
need to say that only persons forty and older are given protection under the ADEA 
because the words it used had already said precisely that. Given the Sentencing 
Commission’s expertise in national sentencing policy and the significant discretion that it 
enjoys in sentencing matters, however, this is absolutely an apples-to-oranges comparison. 
But it nonetheless might illustrate that Congress’s words must be given effect when it 
grants authority to a body with limited power to carry out Congress’s intent. 
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Congress’s intent to make age relevant, one could expect the 
Sentencing Commission to create increased enhancements based on 
the age of the defendant (e.g., one-level enhancements for twenty-one 
to thirty year old adults, two-level enhancements for thirty-one to 
forty year old adults) or the proximity in age between the defendant 
and minor (e.g., one-level enhancements for adult defendants over the 
age of twenty-one who are within five years of the minor, two-level 
enhancements for defendants over the age of twenty-one who are 
between five and ten years older than the minor). It was 
unreasonable, however, to eliminate the relevance of the defendant’s 
age altogether. 
As you reach this point in the Article,197 my goal is that your 
willingness to defer to the Sentencing Commission’s decision to 
eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age for purposes of applying 
a use-of-minor enhancement has exceeded its logical limit (or is at 
least seriously waning). But the ground on which to reject the 
Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of section 3B1.4 has not been 
fully traveled. In addition to viewing the explicit text of the 
congressional directive to glean Congress’s intent, we also have at our 
disposal the legislative history behind the directive, including the 
context in which the directive was enacted. When the text and 
legislative history are reviewed together, the small amount of daylight 
that some see cascading upon the Sentencing Commission’s discretion 
disappears entirely. The resulting conclusion is an unmistakable sense 
that the Sentencing Commission’s decision to enact a use-of-minor 
enhancement devoid of age restrictions for defendants took place in 
utter darkness (i.e., without congressional authority). 
B. Legislative History Reveals that Congress Intended that the Age of 
a Defendant Is Relevant for Sentencing Purposes to Ensure that 
Only Adults at Least Twenty-one Years of Age Receive Sentence 
Enhancements for Corrupting Minors 
After comparing the plain language of the congressional directive 
to section 3B1.4, you might find yourself agreeing with this Article’s 
analysis and conclusion that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 
authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. On the other hand, you may 
also find yourself grudgingly conceding that because the Sentencing 
Commission enjoys broad discretion in promulgating guidelines and 
 
 197. As all authors impliedly do, thank you for reaching this point of the Article! 
Please continue reading. 
2011] BUT I’M NOT TWENTY-ONE YET 251 
Congress was not crystal clear in demonstrating that only defendants 
at least twenty-one years of age should receive a use-of-minor 
enhancement, section 3B1.4 might loosely comply with Congress’s 
intent. Obviously, you still must wrestle with the knowledge that the 
defendant’s age is now wholly irrelevant for purposes of the use-of-
minor enhancement. Was that Congress’s intent? Fortunately, we are 
not left entirely to our own devices to simply parse words to glean the 
intent behind the congressional directive. Clear, unmistakable, and 
uncontroverted legislative history underscores the plain language of 
the congressional directive to further reveal that age restrictions for 
defendants are mandatory, not discretionary. When the congressional 
directive’s plain language and the legislative history are viewed 
together, it becomes apparent that Congress intended that only adult 
defendants at least twenty-one years old who corrupt minors under 
the age of eighteen would receive a use-of-minor enhancement. 
Although the directive’s legislative history is not going to make a 
dramatic entry into this argument, it is a persuasive piece of my 
argument that might sway you closer to concluding that the 
Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by not heeding 
Congress’s intent that the age of a defendant who uses a minor to 
commit a federal crime must be relevant in federal sentencing. 
Federal courts have mostly avoided the legislative history behind 
the congressional directive in determining whether the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority in eliminating age restrictions for 
defendants from its use-of-minor enhancement. Of the five federal 
circuit courts that have addressed the use-of-minor issue, the Seventh 
Circuit in Ramsey was the only court to really attempt to reveal 
Congress’s intent by reviewing the congressional directive’s legislative 
history.198 But even the Seventh Circuit made only a cursory pass at 
the legislative history. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit recognized that 
the age restriction in the directive actually became more restrictive as 
the legislation made its way through Congress, since the restriction 
originally applied to defendants who were eighteen years of age and 
then was amended to only apply to defendants at least twenty-one 
years of age.199 Based on this realization, the Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged that the legislative history made it more difficult to 
conclude that section 3B1.4 complied with Congress’s intent.200 
 
 198.  See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 199.  See id. 
 200.  See id. 
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In a classic example of how the same information can be 
processed to reach a different conclusion, the district court in 
Delarosa relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey that 
“detailed extensively” the Crime Bill’s legislative history to conclude 
that “Congress never intended the enhancement to apply to a 
defendant who was younger than the minors he recruited.”201 
Explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s concern in Butler “that the 
existence of an age differential allows an older, adult party to 
influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous behavior”202 was 
not present; the district court held that applying section 3B1.4 to 
Delarosa “would impermissibly conflict with a clear Congressional 
directive.”203 In rejecting section 3B1.4’s application, the district court 
in Delarosa was mostly influenced by the directive’s plain language, 
but it was also convinced that the legislative history proved that 
Congress never intended for defendants under the age of eighteen, 
and younger than the minors used, to receive a use-of-minor sentence 
enhancement.204 
In addition to the impact that the legislative history had on the 
district court in Delarosa, Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit was also 
convinced by the legislative history that Congress intended that only 
defendants at least twenty-one years old would receive a use-of-minor 
enhancement.205 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, Judge Heaney found 
persuasive the legislative history that Congress had “considered and 
rejected a directive that would apply the enhancement to all 
defendants eighteen and over, instead settling on one that would 
apply only to those twenty-one and over.”206 As acknowledged by the 
Seventh Circuit, the district court in Delarosa, and Judge Heaney, the 
legislative history behind the congressional directive provides strong 
support for the conclusion that Congress intended that only adult 
defendants at least twenty-one years of age should receive use-of-
minor sentence enhancements. 
Even though the legislative history behind the congressional 
directive is vitally important in that it buttresses the congressional 
intent gleaned from the directive’s plain language, it is not easy to 
 
 201.  United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006) (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857–58). 
 202.  Id. (quoting United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See id. 
 205.  See United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., 
concurring). 
 206.  See id. at 789 (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857–58). 
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track. The reason that it is challenging to uncover the legislative 
history is because the congressional directive to promulgate a use-of-
minor enhancement was only a small piece of a massive piece of 
omnibus legislation. To be sure, the congressional directive’s 
legislative history is somewhat mired in the murk of a confusing 
legislative process that was used to pass the gigantic Crime Bill. Once 
discovered, however, the legislative history uniquely and persuasively 
informs us on congressional intent as to the relevance of a defendant’s 
age. 
How did Congress come upon the idea to direct the Sentencing 
Commission to enhance sentences for adult defendants who use 
minors to commit federal offenses? As discussed in Part II, Congress 
used the Crime Bill to direct the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement. On October 26, 1993, 
Congressman Brooks of Texas started the ball rolling by introducing 
House Bill 3131, the U.S. House of Representatives’ version of the 
Crime Bill.207 On November 1, Senator Biden of Delaware introduced 
Senate Bill 1607, the Senate’s version of the Crime Bill.208 Neither of 
the original versions of the Crime Bill contained a directive to the 
Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement. 
On November 3, the House passed its version of the Crime Bill.209 
On November 10, after a few weeks of activity on the Crime Bill 
during that session, Senator Pressler of South Dakota offered 
Amendment 1170 to Senate Bill 1607, which contained, for the first 
time, a directive to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-
of-minor enhancement.210 On November 11, Amendment 1170 passed 
by voice vote and became section 5130 of the Senate’s Crime Bill.211 
Amendment 1170 mostly tracks the actual language that was 
eventually passed in section 140008 of the Crime Bill. The only major 
difference—but critical at that—between the final legislation and the 
original amendment is that Amendment 1170 directed the Sentencing 
Commission to enhance sentences for defendants at least eighteen 
 
 207.  See 139 CONG. REC. E2532 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Hon. Jack 
Brooks). 
 208.  See 139 CONG. REC. S14774 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. Joe 
Biden). 
 209.  See 139 CONG. REC. H8723 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103–
324 (1993). 
 210.  See 139 CONG. REC. S15644–46 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Larry Pressler). 
 211.  See 139 CONG. REC. S17095, S17191 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993). 
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years of age who use minors under the age of eighteen to commit 
federal offenses.212 
It is important to understand that the original amendment 
focused on adults at least eighteen years old, while the final version 
applied only to adults at least twenty-one years old. In addition to 
understanding that the age for defendants subject to an enhancement 
increased, it is equally important to review the policy reasons given by 
the directive’s sponsor. Showing concern over “the rising wave of 
juvenile violence,” Senator Pressler explained that he offered the 
directive to address “particularly heinous circumstance[s] of an adult 
criminal using children to commit their crimes.”213 Believing that the 
directive was “simple and straightforward,” Senator Pressler 
reiterated that all that is involved with the directive is the following 
principle: “If an adult uses a child under 18 years of age to commit a 
[f]ederal offense,” then that adult must be subjected to heightened 
punishment.214 
Senator Pressler further explained that the directive targeted two 
types of crimes. First, the directive targeted gang crimes.215 Stating that 
“[g]ang violence is rising as fast as the age of gang members is 
declining” and that gang crime has grown increasingly more 
sophisticated and complex, Senator Pressler explained that “young 
gang members do not have the knowledge and experience to pull off 
sophisticated crimes.”216 To effectively pull off these sorts of crimes, 
Senator Pressler explained, those young gang members “must be 
taught—and they are—by adults.”217 The second type of crime 
targeted by Senator Pressler’s directive was when adults enlist 
children to commit bank robberies.218 Senator Pressler explained that 
“some adults recruit vulnerable young kids, mostly drug addicts, and 
[then] train them in the ways of crime.”219 Indeed, Senator Pressler 
anguished that many young people are not “being recruited [by 
adults] for the football or debating teams,” but they are instead being 
“encouraged by adults to join another kind of team—criminal 
gangs.”220 
 
 212.  See 139 CONG. REC. S15644 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993). 
 213.  Id. (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler) (emphasis added). 
 214.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 215.  Id. at S15645. 
 216.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 217.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 218.  See id. 
 219.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 220.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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When illustrating how the directive should be applied, Senator 
Pressler parsed no words in detailing how adults who use minors—and 
certainly not minors who use minors—must be given longer sentences 
than those adults who do not use minors to commit federal offenses. 
For example, he said: “Any young person who has been solicited or 
encouraged by an adult to commit a crime should know that the law is 
on his side. With my amendment, the law will be.”221 Additionally, 
Senator Pressler made clear that the directive focused on adult 
defendants who corrupt minors: 
Adults who use our children to commit crimes should be made 
to pay—and pay dearly. They must be punished not just because 
of the crime itself. They must be punished for attempting to 
recruit and train the next generation of criminals. 
Once children are turned down the path of crime and violence, 
it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to turn them away.222 
After making his impassioned plea to protect America’s youth 
against recruitment by adults to commit federal crimes, Senator 
Pressler offered a New York Times article supporting his position that 
the use of minors by adults to commit federal crimes is a real problem 
in America.223 The New York Times article tells a gripping story of 
how “modern-day Fagins” are “training young boys . . . to invade 
banks with automatic weapons, terrorize patrons and tellers[,] and flee 
with money in high-speed freeway getaways in stolen cars.”224 With a 
wonderful analogy to the fictional character, Fagin, from Charles 
Dickens’s Oliver Twist, the New York Times article explains that life is 
now imitating art, but at an alarming rate of growth of debauchery 
and terror.225 The New York Times article quotes two assistant United 
States attorneys who describe two notorious adult bank robbers as 
“appalling corrupters of youth.”226 In eerie detail, the article depicts 
how adult bank robbers recruit, train, and use minors to carry out 
daring and vicious bank robberies with no regard for human life, 
including the life of the recruited minor.227 The congressional 
 
 221.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 222.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 223.  See id. at S15645–46. 
 224.  Id. at S15645. 
 225.  See id. 
 226.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 227.  See id. 
256 SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:205 
directive’s focus is squarely spotlighted on older adult defendants 
recruiting much younger minors into a life of crime.228 
On November 19, the Senate abruptly ended its progression of 
Senate Bill 1607, voting to indefinitely postpone it, and instead 
enacted the language of Senate Bill 1607, including Amendment 1170, 
as part of the House’s Crime Bill, House Bill 3355.229 Also on 
November 19, the Senate sought a conference between the House and 
Senate to consider the different versions of the Crime Bill. After 
months of activity on the Crime Bill that is irrelevant for our 
purposes, on March 24, 1994, Congressman Bishop of Georgia voiced 
his support for the Crime Bill that would, in his words, “increases 
penalties for adults who employ children in their misconduct.”230 At no 
point did a Member of Congress rise to voice his or her support for 
enhancing sentences for young defendants who use other young 
defendants to commit crimes. 
When the Crime Bill returned from conference, the directive’s 
age restriction for the use-of-minor enhancement had been raised 
from eighteen to twenty-one.231 I cannot locate any references to why 
 
 228.  The debate on the use-of-minor enhancement was not conducted in a vacuum. 
The Crime Bill’s focus to protect children from adult predators also encouraged debate on 
whether the United States Code should be amended to include stiffer penalties for adults 
who use minors to commit federal offenses. When offering such an amendment, Senator 
Seymour of California vividly explained why adults who corrupt minors by recruiting them 
into a life of crime should face stiffer penalties than other criminals: 
  [Y]oung kids are already being recruited as foot soldiers by adults with more 
expansive organized crime activities, such as gambling, money laundering, and 
extortion.  
  Sadly, rather than being recruited for football or the debating team, young 
kids are being encouraged to join different kinds of teams—teams who believe 
that the best offense is a good terrorist who can beat the competition with the 
plunge of a knife or the squeeze of a trigger.  
  Those who recruit them, induce them, and coerce them must be held 
accountable. They must pay and pay dearly.  
  And pay they will if my amendment is adopted. If an adult uses any kid to 
commit any [f]ederal crime, he can expect to face a maximum 10-year sentence in 
addition to other sentences that might be levied against him.  
  Kids are our most valuable, our most precious human resource. We have 
heard the old axiom that children represent the promise of tomorrow. But in too 
many cases, criminals see kids as a promise of future crimes committed. 
137 CONG. REC. S8886 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. John Seymour) 
(emphasis added). 
 229.  See 139 CONG. REC. S16302 (daily ed. November 19, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Joe Biden); 139 CONG. REC. S17095 (daily ed. November 24, 1993). 
 230.  140 CONG. REC. E559 (daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Hon. Sanford D. 
Bishop Jr.) (emphasis added). 
 231.  See 140 CONG. REC. H8836 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (directing the Sentencing 
Commission to “promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide that a 
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the conferees raised the age restriction; I also cannot locate any floor 
speeches or conference reports that explain why Congress chose to 
increase the age restriction for defendants who would receive a use-
of-minor enhancement.232 It simply appears that during various 
conferences in July and August 1994, the Crime Bill’s use-of-minor 
directive actually increased the age restriction from eighteen to 
twenty-one years of age, focusing on older adult defendants.233 On 
August 21, the House passed the Crime Bill,234 followed by the 
Senate’s passing of the Crime Bill on August 25.235 The President 
signed the Crime Bill into law on September 13, 1994, at which point 
the Sentencing Commission was directed to promulgate a use-of-
minor enhancement.236 
 
defendant 21 years of age or older who has been convicted of an offense shall receive an 
appropriate sentence enhancement if the defendant involved a minor in the commission of 
the offense”) (emphasis added); see also 140 CONG. REC. H7442 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994). 
 232.  See also United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Though we 
found no discussion in the record explaining the change [from eighteen to twenty-one], the 
eighteen year old formulation was eventually rejected in favor of the narrower 
formulation. The final version of the provision, codified in Pub. L. 103–322, section 140008, 
used the House’s twenty-one years or older formulation.”). 
 233.  See generally 140 CONG. REC. S12283 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1994) (statement of 
Sen. Slade Gorton) (“A proposal originally presented to the House of Representatives and 
meant to be presented to the Senate on a take-it-or-leave-it basis has now, in fact, been 
changed in a number of material ways. It is unfortunate that that crime bill, originally 
reported from a conference committee, was written largely in secret by a small handful of 
[m]embers . . . .”); 140 CONG. REC. E1738 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1994) (statement of Hon. Jim 
Kolbe) (complaining that the legislative process used by the House of Representatives did 
not give members “the opportunity to read and understand the crime bill before we vote 
on it” because “[m]embers . . . had barely [six] hours to examine the 450-plus page 
conference report which just appeared in the Congressional Record.”); 140 CONG. REC. 
H5933 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Hon. Henry Hyde) (explaining that after 
nearly three months since both houses sent their versions of the Crime Bill to conference, 
the legislative process remained “in the deep freeze, frozen in amber, immovable, 
intransigent. Nothing is happening . . . [except] one meeting of the conferees . . . . And then 
it has been Death Valley. Nothing is going on that we know of . . . [except perhaps] stealth 
meetings” not necessarily in “smoke-filled rooms, but they are going on behind closed 
doors.”); 140 CONG. REC. H5934 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Hon. Bob Filner) 
(complaining that although Congress sent the Crime Bill “to a conference committee on 
June 16, the crime bill has been held hostage in committee for [thirty-four] long days”); 140 
CONG. REC. H5935 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Hon. Betty McCollum) 
(explaining that if there were negotiations on the Crime Bill by conferees taking place, “we 
do not know what they are”). 
 234.  See 140 CONG. REC. H2585–640 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (discussing and 
ultimately voting to pass the crime bill). 
 235.  See 140 CONG. REC. S12487–674 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994) (discussing and 
ultimately voting to pass the crime bill).  
 236.  See Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1539–41 (Sept. 13, 1994). 
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It becomes abundantly clear from reviewing the congressional 
directive’s legislative history that at no time was Congress concerned 
about enhancing sentences for every defendant, regardless of age, who 
used a minor to commit a crime. Instead, the directive’s purpose was 
to enhance sentences for adults who use minors to commit federal 
offenses, which could turn out to be recruitment to a larger life of 
crime. Although Congress initially was confronted with a proposal to 
direct the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor 
enhancement for adult defendants at least eighteen years of age who 
use minors who are younger than eighteen, this approach was 
ultimately rejected in favor of focusing on older adults—those at least 
twenty-one years old—who recruit minors into a life of crime by using 
them to commit federal offenses. If various courts are correct in 
concluding that the Sentencing Commission had the authority to 
eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age altogether, then it 
apparently would not have mattered if Congress had openly debated 
the age at which an enhancement should be applied, whether 
eighteen, twenty-one, or even ninety for that matter. Not only did 
Congress deem age a relevant sentencing factor, it stressed the 
importance of an age differential between defendants and minors. 
When this historical record is added to the plain language of the 
directive that requires the Sentencing Commission to specifically 
consider the proximity in age between the adult defendant and minor 
used in promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement, it becomes 
attenuated to then declare that the only congressional intent that one 
can glean is a desire that as long as defendants who are at least 
twenty-one years old receive an enhancement, then every defendant—
no matter how old or how young—can also receive the same sentence 
enhancement. 
There is absolutely no indication—in the plain language of the 
directive or in the legislative history—that Congress sought to 
enhance sentences for defendants under the age of twenty-one who 
use minors to commit federal offenses. Additionally, there is no 
indication that Congress sought to ensure that defendants who are 
themselves minors and use other minors—and perhaps even peers, 
classmates, relatives, or friends—would receive the same sentence 
enhancement as adult defendants who use minors to commit federal 
offenses. Congress simply did not demonstrate that its concern was 
the societal problem of minors using minors to commit federal 
offenses. 
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It nearly defies logic to base a use-of-minor enhancement on the 
foundation that young people are vulnerable, unsophisticated, and in 
need of protection from predatory adults who seek to recruit minors 
into a life of crime and then conclude, in the very same breath, that all 
of those very same minors—the ones who apparently need protection 
from adult recruitment because of various vulnerabilities—are also 
predators from which other minors need protection. Because 
Congress focused its directive on protecting minors from adults who 
prey on children to commit federal offenses, it is unreasonable to then 
conclude that Congress’s actual intent was that everyone who uses a 
minor would receive the same sentence enhancement. Courts should 
adopt the no-authority option to reject the Sentencing Commission’s 
open defiance of congressional intent when it promulgated a use-of-
minor enhancement where a defendant’s age is irrelevant. 
C. The Context in Which Congress Directed the Sentencing 
Commission to Promulgate a Use-of-Minor Enhancement Further 
Reveals Congress’s Intent that the Age of the Adult Who Corrupts 
Minors Must Be Relevant for Sentencing Purposes 
As the evidence of Congress’s intent to focus on adults who 
corrupt minors mounts, the reasonableness of the Sentencing 
Commission’s unsubstantiated decision to eliminate the relevance of 
the defendant’s age diminishes. In addition to the directive’s three 
references to the defendant’s age and the legislative history’s 
passionate focus on protecting vulnerable minors from sophisticated 
adult criminals, there is still more evidence that Congress intended 
that only defendants at least twenty-one years of age would receive 
sentence enhancements. 
Another aspect of the congressional directive’s legislative history 
is to place it in context of the Crime Bill itself. As the Supreme Court 
has recognized, congressional intent can often be discovered by 
viewing both the text and context of legislation.237 Are there any other 
indicators within the same piece of legislation that created the 
congressional directive to the Sentencing Commission that might 
further express whether Congress intended that any defendant, 
regardless of age, would receive a sentence enhancement or whether 
Congress intended that only defendants at least twenty-one years old 
would receive sentence enhancements? 
 
 237.  See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991). 
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Title XIV of the Crime Bill, titled “Youth Violence,” contained 
eight sections.238 One of these is section 140008, titled “Solicitation of 
Minor to Commit Crime,”239 the congressional directive at the center 
of this Article. Two other nearby provisions in the “Youth Violence” 
section shed additional light on Congress’s intent in section 140008. 
The first relevant provision is section 140001, titled “Prosecution as 
Adults of Certain Juveniles for Crimes of Violence,”240 which 
amended 18 U.S.C. § 5032 to lower the age at which some defendants 
who are minors could be prosecuted as adults in federal courts.241 This 
amendment unmistakably demonstrates that Congress knew how to 
communicate when it was dealing with minors and when it was dealing 
with adults.242 Thus, sections 140001 and 140008 both focus on the 
differences between adults and minors. Additionally, because 
Congress decided in section 140001 to specifically deal more harshly 
with certain identified minors in the criminal system, had Congress 
wanted to continue that enhanced treatment of minors in section 
140008, it would have done so explicitly. That is, Congress had already 
considered enhanced punishment for minors in the same section of 
the Crime Bill. A contextual reading of the two sections indicates that 
Congress did not intend to enhance the sentences of minors under 
section 140008’s directive to the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement. Instead, as Congress 
transitioned from section 140001 to section 140008, its focus shifted 
entirely from enhancing punishment for certain minors to protecting 
minors from adult defendants at least twenty-one years old. 
A second nearby provision that was part of the “Youth Violence” 
section of the Crime Bill further demonstrates Congress’s intent to 
treat adults who corrupt minors more severely than other defendants. 
Section 140006, titled “Increased Penalties for Employing Children to 
Distribute Drugs Near Schools and Playgrounds,” amended the 
Controlled Substances Act to increase the sentences of adults “at least 
21 years of age” who use minors “under 18 years of age” to distribute 
drugs near playgrounds and schools.243 When Congress used the ages 
of twenty-one and eighteen in section 140008, it was not its first 
expression of intent to enhance punishment for adults who corrupt 
 
 238.  See Crime Bill, Pub. L. 103-322, tit. XIV, 108 Stat. 1796, 2031–33 (1994). 
 239.  Id. § 140008. 
 240.  Id. § 140001. 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006) (authorizing prosecution of juvenile 
offenders as adults for certain gang activity). 
 243.  See § 140006, 108 Stat. at 2032; see also 21 U.S.C. § 860(c) (1994). 
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minors. Instead, it was part of a pattern of protecting children from 
adults who would change the course of a young person’s life and 
direct it toward crime. 
Even though it might be true that some young people have the 
potential to manipulate, coerce, and intimidate other young people, 
Congress was not addressing that issue when it focused on adults who 
corrupt minors. Significantly, when the Sentencing Commission 
promulgated section 3B1.4, it did not provide a detailed analysis or 
explanation of why minors (or even young adults under the age of 
twenty-one) who negatively impact the lives of minors should receive 
the same punishment as adults older than twenty-one who do so. This 
is particularly so when you view Congress’s directive through a lens 
with an indelible focus on adults at least twenty-one years old on the 
one hand and minors under the age of eighteen on the other. The 
Sentencing Commission simply mistook Congress’s focus and, by 
doing so, defied Congress’s intent by eliminating the relevance of a 
defendant’s age. 
In addition to the congressional directive’s plain language and 
legislative history that focus exclusively on the ages of the defendant 
and minor used, the Sentencing Commission must also comply with its 
own implementing legislation. In meting out the appropriate 
punishment through the application of defendant-specific guidelines, 
the Sentencing Commission must consider the age of the defendant.244 
In establishing the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines, 
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider, among 
other things, a defendant’s age, education, vocational skills, mental 
and emotional condition, physical condition, previous employment 
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties.245 In 
carrying out Congress’s intent in promulgating a use-of-minor 
enhancement, the Sentencing Commission provided no explanation as 
to why the age of the defendant became a wholly irrelevant factor at 
sentencing. Given Congress’s specific direction to focus on the ages of 
the defendant and the minor, especially in light of Congress’s general 
direction to also consider age and maturity issues, the Sentencing 
Commission responded with its explanation that it was simply 
promulgating a guideline in a “slightly broader form” than what 
Congress directed.246 
 
 244.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1) (2000). 
 245.  See § 994(d)(1)–(8), (e). 
 246.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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When a defendant’s age is no longer relevant for sentencing 
purposes, the form of punishment morphs into something entirely 
different than what was sought. One can imagine multiple scenarios—
including the facts of the cases that have challenged section 3B1.4’s 
application to defendants under the age of twenty-one as well as the 
hypothetical scenarios depicted in Part V.A.—that reveal vast policy 
differences in sentencing defendants who use minors. On one extreme 
is Congress’s approach that focuses on the age of the defendant and 
the proximity in age between the defendant and minor; on the other 
end of the spectrum stands the Sentencing Commission’s approach to 
discard any relevance of the age of the defendant or the proximity in 
age between the defendant and minor. Congress focused on particular 
defendants; the Sentencing Commission focused on every conceivable 
defendant. The Sentencing Commission’s approach is not a subset 
within the congressional directive, nor is Congress’s approach simply a 
subset of section 3B1.4. The two approaches are different approaches 
that address different societal problems. For purposes of addressing 
those adult defendants who prey on vulnerable young people to 
recruit them into a life of crime, age matters. Because the Sentencing 
Commission chose to ignore the relevance of age in punishing 
defendants who use minors to commit federal offenses, it defied 
Congress’s objective to focus on age. 
Finally, on the same day that Senator Pressler offered his 
amendment to the Senate’s Crime Bill that directed the Sentencing 
Commission to adopt a use-of-minor enhancement for defendants at 
least twenty-one years old, another amendment was offered that 
sought to provide enhanced penalties for defendants who use minors 
to make pornography that is imported into the United States.247 This 
amendment lacked any age restriction for defendants—it did not 
contain an age restriction for the defendant or reference the proximity 
in age between the defendant and the minor used. Congress again 
showed that it knew how to express its intent to enhance penalties for 
persons without age restrictions. Congress also knew how to say what 
 
 247.  See 139 CONG. REC. S15643 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (Amend. No. 1168); see 
also 21 U.S.C. § 861 (2006) (making it unlawful for all defendants to use minors under the 
age of eighteen in various criminal drug activity); United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 
1285 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 21 U.S.C. § 861 is “similar in language and purpose 
to” section 3B1.4). 
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it meant when it came to a use-of-minor enhancement—the 
defendant’s age matters.248 
D. Inferring Congressional Intent from Congress’s Silence During the 
Guidelines’ Review Period Involves No Legal Analysis, 
Unnecessarily Expands the Sentencing Commission’s Power, and 
Runs into the Political Reality that Members of Congress Do Not 
Run “Get-Weak-on-Crime” Campaigns 
After the Sentencing Commission presented section 3B1.4 to 
Congress in a “slightly broader form,” Congress had 180 days to 
review and reject the proposed guideline. Congress did not reject it. 
Some courts contend that Congress thus ratified the expanded use-of-
minor enhancement, impliedly revealing that it did not care whether 
the age of the defendant was relevant at sentencing, as long as every 
defendant at least twenty-one years old who used a minor to commit a 
federal offense received a sentence enhancement. This after-the-fact 
reasoning defies congressional intent as seen in the plain language of 
its legislation and legislative history, wholly abandons any judicial role 
in ensuring that a body of limited power like the Sentencing 
Commission complies with congressional directives, and ignores the 
political reality that sounding weak on crime rarely works out in 
congressional campaigns. 
 
 248.  In a case involving capital murder and a jury’s ability to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing (the defendant was nineteen years old), the Supreme Court 
made the following statement about age: 
Our cases recognize that “youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and 
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological damage.” A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and 
ill-considered actions and decisions. A sentencer in a capital case must be 
allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in the course of its 
deliberations over the appropriate sentence. 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 350, 367 (1993) (citation omitted). Although this 
understanding of the innate differences between minors and adults is not on point to the 
application of the use-of-minor enhancement, the Supreme Court recognizes that 
sentencing minors and adults is not the same task that involves the same calculations and 
serves the same purposes. This reflection on age fundamentally underscores Congress’s 
directive to the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences for adults at least twenty-one 
years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses and to consider the proximity in 
age between the adult defendant and the minor used. It also underscores a major policy 
distinction between enhancing sentences for adults over the age of twenty-one as opposed 
to adults—or minors for that matter—under the age of twenty-one. 
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In his dissent in Butler, Judge Clay was clear that he would have 
concluded that the Sentencing Commission had exceeded its authority 
in promulgating section 3B1.4 if the only evidence of Congress’s intent 
was section 140008.249 When focusing on the congressional directive’s 
plain language, Judge Clay concluded that “Congress intended—and 
provided in unambiguous terms—for sentence enhancement for 
solicitation of a minor to commit crime only for defendants age 21 and 
older.”250 In Judge Clay’s opinion, it was “unimaginable” that 
Congress could have shown a “clearer expression of congressional 
intent” than it did in directing the Sentencing Commission to enhance 
sentences only for defendants at least twenty-one years old who use 
minors to commit federal offenses.251 Judge Clay was not persuaded, 
however, that Congress had expressed its intent only by the words it 
used. Judge Clay believed that the best expression of Congress’s 
intent was not its legislative directive; instead, Congress’s intent was 
best discovered by how it reacted to the Sentencing Commission’s 
submission of a guideline that admittedly was in a “slightly broader 
form.”252 Judge Clay was persuaded that because Congress did not 
reject the use-of-minor enhancement devoid of age restrictions, while 
rejecting other proposed guidelines, “Congress, in effect, approved of 
[the enhancement] as an appropriate reflection of its policy on the 
sentencing of those who involved minors in their crimes.”253 
Explaining that Congress had “disapproved of a proposed amendment 
that would have eliminated the 100:1 sentencing ratio that treats one 
who deals in a given quantity of crack cocaine the same as it treats one 
who deals in 100 times as much powder cocaine,” Judge Clay thus 
extrapolated Congress’s intent from its failure to reject an expanded 
use-of-minor enhancement.254 
Even though Judge Clay deemed it obvious that “the initial intent 
of Congress” was to limit the enhancement only to defendants at least 
twenty-one years old, he nonetheless concluded “that the intent of 
Congress changed” when “Congress ultimately failed to express 
disagreement with expansion of the enhancement to include 
 
 249.  See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 844–46 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J., 
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 252.  See id. at 844–45. 
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defendants” of every age.255 Judge Clay does not stand alone in 
adopting this changed intent theory. The Seventh Circuit in Ramsey 
picked up on Judge Clay’s reasoning and also concluded that because 
Congress had rejected some guidelines but not the expanded use-of-
minor enhancement, Congress implicitly ratified the Sentencing 
Commission’s wholesale elimination of the age restriction.256 
Instead of focusing on Congress’s intent from the plain language 
of the directive or its legislative history, the changed-intent approach 
discounts the relevance of what Congress said and did at the time it 
enacted legislation, and chooses to focus on what Congress did not do 
and did not say at some distant future time. This changed intent 
theory claims that Congress’s intent is not discovered through a 
rigorous review of the language it used or the legislative history; 
rather, intent can be gleaned from a failure to act, despite what the 
rigorous review concluded. 
This after-the-fact changed-intent theory can render 
congressional language meaningless. What if Congress had directed 
the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences “for only 
defendants who are at least twenty-one years of age,” but the 
Sentencing Commission nonetheless promulgated the section 3B1.4 
enhancement for all defendants, regardless of age? According to 
Judge Clay, that is precisely what took place here. Judge Clay 
concluded that the plain language of the congressional directive was 
unmistakably clear that Congress intended that only defendants at 
least twenty-one years old would receive use-of-minor 
enhancements.257 He nonetheless was convinced that Congress’s intent 
was not shown through the plain and unmistakable language of the 
directive, but it was displayed by Congress rejecting some guidelines 
while not rejecting the expanded use-of-minor enhancement.258 Judge 
Clay was not persuaded by Congress’s language; he was persuaded by 
Congress’s silence. 
When determining congressional intent, silence should not have 
such a deafening effect on actual words and positive action. The 
Supreme Court has cautioned against just this type of after-the-fact 
discovery of congressional intent: “An inference drawn from 
congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary 
 
 255.  Id. at 846. 
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to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.”259 
As the Supreme Court has illustrated, basing congressional intent on 
“congressional ‘silence’” could “render what Congress has expressly 
said absurd.”260 When congressional intent can be determined by 
legislation’s plain language, history, and purpose, federal courts—and 
the Sentencing Commission—must give effect to that intent, 
regardless of Congress’s failure to speak against a conclusion that 
defies that congressional intent.261 
Speaking of absurdities, now assume that Congress had directed 
the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences “only, only, only, 
only and only for defendants at least twenty-one years of age (and we 
really mean only those defendants and nobody else)” who use minors 
to commit federal offenses. Assume further that Congress later failed 
to reject a use-of-minor enhancement that scrubbed any relevance of 
the defendant’s age (i.e., section 3B1.4). Some courts would 
apparently bless the Sentencing Commission’s expanded 
enhancement and apply it to any defendant, regardless of age, because 
Congress’s silence in failing to reject the expanded enhancement was 
a better indicator of its intent than the unmistakable language it used 
in directing the Sentencing Commission to promulgate an 
enhancement in the first place. This changed-intent approach is 
entirely backwards. Congress’s words—not just its silence—must also 
be analyzed in determining congressional intent. 
e Sixth Circuit likewise dismissed the so-called congressional-
silence theory (or as this Article calls it, the changed-intent theory), 
reasoning that to accept it “would lead courts wholly to abandon their 
role of assessing whether enacted guidelines comport with 
[c]ongressional intent.”262 The Sixth Circuit explained that adopting 
the congressional silence or changed intent theory “would thus dictate 
that all enacted guidelines inherently satisfied [c]ongressional intent,” 
because every guideline that goes into effect has gone through the 
180-day review period without congressional rejection.263 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning cannot be ignored. Because every 
enacted guideline has survived the 180-day review period, the 
congressional-silence or changed-intent theory would dictate that 
Congress intended precisely what the Sentencing Commission 
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promulgated, regardless of what Congress said and did in directing the 
Sentencing Commission to act. Instead of playing a crucial role to 
ensure that the Sentencing Commission, a body with limited power, 
complies with a grant of authority from Congress, the judiciary would 
be relegated to courts without a purpose and without reason. The only 
question under a congressional-silence or changed-intent theory 
would be whether Congress rejected a proposed guideline from the 
Sentencing Commission. If the answer to that question is no, then the 
court must presume that the guideline satisfies Congress’s intent. Not 
only is this approach not the law, it eliminates the role of the judicial 
function to determine congressional intent, leaving that decision solely 
to the Sentencing Commission. 
One response to this rejection of the congressional-silence or 
changed-intent theory might be that the 180-day review period plays a 
critical role in ferreting out Congress’s intent. The argument is that if 
Congress created the review period to give itself a chance to reject or 
modify proposed guidelines, then Congress implicitly sanctioned the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority to expand on congressional intent 
if Congress does not expressly reject what the Sentencing Commission 
does. This approach puts the cart in front of the horse. When the 
Sentencing Commission acts under the specific guidance and authority 
of Congress, it must follow congressional intent. To the extent that 
congressional intent is unambiguous, the Sentencing Commission has 
no authority to reject Congress’s intent. This would expand the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority in the face of Congress’s 
authority. Even though the Sentencing Commission has a fair amount 
of discretion, that discretion cannot override congressional directives. 
The issue of congressional intent should never boil down to an 
analysis of whether Congress had the authority to reject a proposed 
guideline, because Congress assuredly has that power (which it 
granted to itself). It would be entirely nonsensical to create legal 
principles that courts must apply to determine whether the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority if Congress’s intent can always be 
determined simply by asking whether Congress rejected a proposed 
guideline during the review period. The outcome of such an approach 
would be to dismiss the significance of judicial review—in each case, 
the only question would be whether Congress ratified the Sentencing 
Commission’s work. 
Instead of creating a judicial-review function that has nothing to 
review, the issue in every case challenging the Sentencing 
Commission’s authority to promulgate a guideline that is arguably at 
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odds with congressional intent is to determine, in the first instance, 
what Congress intended when it drafted a directive to the Sentencing 
Commission. If reason dictates a conclusion that the Sentencing 
Commission defied Congress’s intent, then the law requires a decision 
that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority. The only time 
that the 180-day review period should be relevant to determine 
Congress’s intent is when a congressional directive is unclear and 
ambiguous. Those situations should be the only universe in which the 
180-day review period should be used as an after-the-fact ratification 
process. 
Again, the proponents of a congressional-silence or changed-
intent theory could argue that because Congress gave itself the 
authority to review and reject proposed guidelines, then Congress has 
elected to be bound by all guidelines regardless of Congress’s original 
approach to an issue as seen in the language it used. Even if this 
principle changed the judicial function in reviewing the Sentencing 
Commission’s authority by only looking to see if Congress rejected a 
proposed guideline, the principle’s real-world, practical application 
may fall short. The politics of crime could impact how the 
congressional-silence or changed-intent theory worked in practice. 
The allure of the argument that Congress could have 
demonstrated its intent by simply rejecting the Sentencing 
Commission’s expansion of the use-of-minor enhancement to include 
any defendant, regardless of age, may not carry much weight as a 
political matter. It is a rare sighting, perhaps as rare as seeing Raphus 
cucullatus,264 to see large factions of politicians arguing that criminals 
should receive lighter sentences.265 The political drumbeat of being 
“tough on crime” seems to support enhanced and longer sentences, 
even if the drumbeat of such rhetoric fails to prove successful results 
such as less crime, manageable court dockets, or effective prison 
operations.266 During the debate of the Crime Bill itself, Senator 
Simon of Illinois decried the political urge to “rush to be tough” on 
crime, exclaiming that the Crime Bill rested “on the seductive belief 
that we can fight crime simply by passing tougher and tougher 
sentencing laws.”267 The policy concern that tougher sentencing laws 
do not effectively fight crime is intensified when Congress not only 
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chooses to enhance penalties for crime, but then the Sentencing 
Commission doubles down to increase those enhanced penalties. By 
forcing Congress to publicly fight against the Sentencing Commission 
for less punitive sentences for criminals, the result might be 
Congress’s unwillingness to engage in that debate. Thus, even in the 
face of clear congressional intent based on a directive’s plain language 
and legislative history, the Sentencing Commission’s ultimate 
rejection of congressional intent in favor of enhanced penalties may 
face little, if any, political resistance. 
One very public display of the political get-tough-on-crime 
mindset might be the nearly three-decade debate over the 
reasonableness of imposing much harsher sentences for crimes 
involving the same amounts of crack cocaine as opposed to powder 
cocaine.268 Indeed, the so-called 100:1 crack–powder disparity resulted 
in the same sentences for defendants convicted of drug crimes 
involving cocaine who possess 100 times more powder cocaine as 
defendants who possess crack cocaine.269 As will be discussed more 
fully below, the Supreme Court has been forced to explain the 
judiciary’s role in resolving the conflict between Congress’s intent to 
maintain the 100:1 crack–powder disparity and the Sentencing 
Commission’s desire to decrease the disparity.270 Although it is one 
thing for the Sentencing Commission to seek to decrease penalties for 
crime and face congressional rejection of getting weak on crime, it is 
quite another scenario to reverse the roles and force Congress to 
become the body that seeks to lessen penalties in the face of a 
Sentencing Commission that seeks to enhance penalties. The political 
realities of “fighting” crime might not allow this result. 
A recent book argued that the political reality in the United 
States (as well as in other western countries such as Britain, Canada, 
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and Australia) is that fear of crime and tough, punitive sentences 
appeal to voters.271 More recently, the Economist issued its magazine 
with the following cover: “Why America locks up too many people.”272 
The magazine’s editor claimed that “lawmakers who wish to sound 
tough must propose laws tougher than the ones that the last chap who 
wanted to sound tough proposed.”273 Explaining that America 
incarcerates one in one hundred of its adult citizens and has a total 
prison population of 2,300,000, the editor maintained that the political 
reality of crime is that “for the past [forty] years American lawmakers 
have generally regarded selling to voters the idea of locking up fewer 
people as political suicide.”274 There can be no doubt that more people 
are being imprisoned these days. In the past forty years, the number 
of imprisoned Americans has grown from fewer than one in 400 to 
one in 100.275 According to another story in the Economist, American 
“voters, alarmed at a surge in violent crime, have demanded fiercer 
sentences,” and “[p]oliticians have obliged.”276 The story also depicts 
the political difficulty in lowering the penalties for criminals: “Since 
no politician wants to be tarred as soft on crime, such laws, mandating 
minimum sentences, are seldom softened. On the contrary, they tend 
to get harder.”277 An after-the-fact ratification principle that looks to 
see if Congress reiterated its original intent by fighting the Sentencing 
Commission to reduce punishment for criminals who use minors to 
commit crimes is not an appealing option for judicial review of the 
Sentencing Commission’s compliance with congressional authority. 
Do not misunderstand the point of this argument. This Article is 
not interested in debating the overall effectiveness of our criminal-
justice system or whether it is too punitive. This Article also is not 
taking a position on prison overcrowding or how minors should be 
treated in our criminal-justice system. This Article does not bemoan 
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the political notion of being tough on crime or using imprisonment to 
punish criminals. Additionally, this Article does not even make a case 
for treating minors as minors and adults as adults. 
Instead, this Article focuses on the proper judicial role in 
ensuring that the Sentencing Commission acts within its limited 
authority under congressional directives. The political reality of crime 
is simply being used to counter the alluring principle that the 
congressional-silence or changed-intent theory ensures that 
congressional intent can be gleaned by Congress’s failure to reject 
proposed guidelines from the Sentencing Commission. When 
presented with a proposed guideline like section 3B1.4 that enhances 
penalties beyond Congress’s original intent, Congress may not have 
the political ability to clarify its original intent. If courts then glean 
intent from Congress’s silence and not from Congress’s language, then 
that silence could be seriously and tragically misinterpreted. That is 
the point. If this is true, then the congressional-silence or changed-
intent theory could have dangerous consequences in that Congress’s 
intent cannot accurately be expressed by its silence; it is instead 
subverted. 
A major purpose behind the creation of the Sentencing 
Commission, and thus the Guidelines themselves, is to “provide 
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing [by] 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal 
conduct.”278 Expounding on this fundamental purpose, Justice Breyer 
has explained that a “just legal system seeks not only to treat different 
cases differently but also to treat like cases alike.”279 According to 
Justice Breyer, “[f]airness requires sentencing uniformity as well as 
efforts to recognize relevant sentencing differences.”280 Until the 
section 3B1.4 enhancement issue is resolved, defendants who are 
under the age of twenty-one who use minors to commit federal 
offenses will continue to receive disparate sentences despite 
Congress’s intent to enhance sentences only for adults twenty-one and 
older who use minors to commit federal offenses. To ensure that 
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congressional intent is followed, district courts outside of the Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits should adopt the reasoning 
of this Article and utilize the no-authority option. Even the circuit 
courts which have rejected the no-authority option can revisit the 
issue through en banc review. All of these courts should declare that 
the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of the expanded use-of-
minor enhancement defied Congress’s intent and should not be 
enforced against defendants under the age of twenty-one. 
The adoption of the no-authority option may simply exacerbate 
the split of authority on the issue, however. This split may force the 
Supreme Court to adopt or reject the no-authority option. Until the 
issue is finally resolved (in favor of the no-authority option perhaps), 
the Guidelines’ purpose in uniform and fair sentences will not be 
achieved. The unfortunate result is that defendants in different 
jurisdictions will continue to receive markedly disparate sentencing 
reatment for the same conduct. 
No matter the ultimate outcome on the no-authority option, 
however, this Article explains that district courts have alternative 
options on how to deal with the Sentencing Commission’s expansive 
use-of-minor enhancement. District courts have the discretionary 
authority to overcome sentencing disparities by rejecting section 
3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of twenty-one. 
District courts have this authority regardless of the circuit split or 
whether the Supreme Court resolves the split. Under an advisory 
guidelines system, district courts now have tremendous discretionary 
authority to escape the strictures of the no-authority option to 
consider two other options to ensure that defendants under the age of 
twenty-one do not receive use-of-minor enhancements. As explained 
in Part VI, federal courts can adopt the policy-disagreement option or 
the individualized-assessment option to carry out Congress’s intent to 
apply a use-of-minor enhancement only to adult defendants at least 
twenty-one years of age. 
VI. ALL ROADS MIGHT STILL LEAD TO ROME: DISTRICT COURTS 
HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPLY THE USE-OF-MINOR 
ENHANCEMENT AS CONGRESS ORIGINALLY INTENDED BY 
UTILIZING THE POLICY-DISAGREEMENT OPTION OR THE 
INDIVIDUALIZED-ASSESSMENT OPTION IN AN ADVISORY 
GUIDELINES SYSTEM 
Although this Article concludes that the Sentencing Commission 
exceeded congressional authority by promulgating section 3B1.4 
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without an age restriction such that courts should adopt the no-
authority option, that legal position is not the end of the road as far as 
the issue is concerned. The issue of the Sentencing Commission’s 
authority could become less relevant if district courts use their 
significant sentencing discretion in applying section 3B1.4 of the 
now-advisory guidelines only to defendants who are at least twenty-
one years of age. A brief introduction now to district courts’ discretion 
on how to deal with section 3B1.4 might aid in digesting the extended 
discussion below. 
In a watershed sentencing case, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Booker struck down the mandatory nature of the Guidelines 
as unconstitutional.281 The old mandatory sentencing regime fell to an 
advisory sentencing system. In place of the mandatory regime that 
existed at the time each of the circuit courts confronted the issue of 
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in 
promulgating section 3B1.4, an advisory Guidelines system now exists. 
Under this system, district courts must still consult the Guidelines to 
calculate an advisory sentencing range. If the no-authority option is 
adopted, the range will never include the use-of-minor enhancement 
for defendants under the age of twenty-one. If the no-authority option 
is rejected, then the range will include a two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement for defendants under twenty-one. Once the advisory 
sentencing range is calculated, however, district courts must then 
consider all sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to 
impose an appropriate sentence.282 The Guidelines’ range is simply 
one factor among many that the district court must consider in 
imposing an appropriate sentence,283 one that is not greater than 
necessary to serve the purposes of federal sentencing. District courts 
are thus freed from the constraints of the mandatory guidelines 
regime, which in four circuits includes the mandatory application of 
section 3B1.4 to defendants younger than twenty-one years of age. 
District courts in every circuit are now free to look upon the 
Guidelines’ range, which could include the application of section 
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement if the no-authority option is 
rejected, as merely advisory. 
How will an advisory system impact the issue of whether district 
courts must apply section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to 
defendants who are not twenty-one years old? Under an advisory 
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system, district courts have two options to comply with Congress’s 
intent of rejecting sentence enhancements for defendants under 
twenty-one years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses. 
First, district courts can now make an on-the-record policy 
disagreement with the Sentencing Commission’s use-of-minor 
enhancement that does not have an age restriction. I call this first 
option the policy-disagreement option.284 In essence, the rationale for 
the policy-disagreement option is that the Sentencing Commission 
exceeded congressional authority by removing the relevance of a 
defendant’s age in applying a use-of-minor enhancement. Another 
basis for the policy disagreement is that the Sentencing Commission 
has not demonstrated that it used its sentencing expertise to decide 
that defendants under twenty-one years of age should receive the 
same enhancement as defendants over twenty-one. Because the 
Sentencing Commission did not expand the congressionally directed 
use-of-minor enhancement based on its institutional strengths, little 
deference is due the Sentencing Commission. 
Second, district courts can make an individualized, case-by-case 
assessment on whether applying section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor 
enhancement to a defendant under the age of twenty-one would 
produce a sentence in a particular case that is greater than necessary 
to meet the purposes of federal sentencing. I call this second option 
the individualized-assessment option.285 If a district court decides that 
the use-of-minor enhancement will result in an excessive sentence, 
then the court has the discretion to sentence the defendant to a below-
Guidelines sentence. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker may moot—
or at least tamp down—the importance of the original debate over the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4’s use-
of-minor enhancement devoid of age restrictions. In jurisdictions that 
adopt the no-authority option and conclude that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 
without an age restriction, the advisory Guidelines range for 
defendants under twenty-one years of age will never include a two-
level use-of-minor enhancement. In jurisdictions that reject the no-
authority option and hold that the Sentencing Commission did not 
exceed its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor 
enhancement (currently the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits), district courts must still apply the two-level use-of-minor 
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enhancement to defendants under twenty-one years of age to 
determine the appropriate Guidelines range. Under the now-advisory 
sentencing system, however, those district courts are then free to undo 
the effects of the misplaced application of section 3B1.4’s use-of-
minor enhancement to younger defendants under the policy-
disagreement option or the individualized-assessment option. 
A. A Brief Tour of the Road from a Mandatory Guidelines Regime 
to an Advisory Guidelines System: Welcome to the Land of 
Booker, Kimbrough, and Spears 
For nearly twenty years, district courts labored under a 
mandatory Guidelines regime. That regime began to crumble in 2004. 
In Blakely v. Washington, a case involving the State of Washington’s 
version of sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court held that a 
district court violates the Sixth Amendment by imposing a sentence 
on a defendant that exceeds the statutory maximum of the offenses 
committed based on the court’s, and not a jury’s, factual findings in 
applying sentence enhancements under the Guidelines.286 As a base 
matter, the Supreme Court observed, “When a judge inflicts 
punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has 
not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the 
punishment,’ . . . and the judge exceeds his proper authority.”287 Thus, 
the Court held that parts of Washington’s sentencing guidelines were 
unconstitutional to the extent that they deprived a defendant of his 
Sixth Amendment right to “insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury 
all facts legally essential to the punishment.”288 The Court tried to 
make clear that its decision was “not about whether determinate 
sentencing is constitutional, [but] only about how it can be 
implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment.”289 The 
Court’s decision in Blakely—applicable only to a single state’s 
sentencing scheme—was the first blow that would ultimately take 
down the mandatory nature of the federal sentencing system. 
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Later, in Booker, the Supreme Court confronted the mandatory 
nature of the Guidelines in federal sentencing.290 Reaffirming that the 
Sixth Amendment requires “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) 
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum 
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict 
must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” the Court extended its decision in Blakely to the 
federal Guidelines system.291 In crafting the appropriate remedy to the 
unconstitutional nature of the mandatory Guidelines system, the 
Court severed the parts of the legislation that created the Guidelines 
and those that made it unconstitutional.292 Once those unconstitutional 
provisions were removed from the statute, the Court reasoned, then 
the remaining sentencing system is constitutional, but it no longer 
retains its status as a mandatory regime.293 Instead, the Court’s 
decision to sever the unconstitutional parts of the statute rendered 
“the Guidelines effectively advisory.”294 Under this system, district 
courts must consider “Guidelines ranges,” but they are permitted “to 
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns.”295 The Court 
declared, “[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account 
when sentencing.”296 Although district courts are no longer 
constrained by the mandatory application of the Guidelines, they still 
must consult the Guidelines along with other sentencing factors to 
determine the appropriate sentence.297 
Under the federal sentencing system, district courts must consider 
the following seven factors under § 3553(a)—only one of which is the 
now-advisory sentencing range established by the application of the 
 
 290.  543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (“The Guidelines as written, however, are not 
advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges. While subsection (a) of § 3553 of 
the sentencing statute lists the Sentencing Guidelines as one factor to be considered in 
imposing a sentence, subsection (b) directs that the court ‘shall impose a sentence of the 
kind, and within the range’ established by the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, 
limited cases.”). 
 291.  Id. at 244. 
 292.  See id. at 245. Specifically, the Court excised 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 
3742(e), which collectively had the effect of making the Guidelines mandatory. Id. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. at 264 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5) (2006)). 
 297.  See id. 
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Guidelines—to determine the appropriate sentence for a federal 
defendant:298 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established 
for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 
[G]uidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, 
subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by 
act of Congress (regardless of whether such 
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the 
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under 
section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in 
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised 
release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into 
account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy 
statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such 
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing 
Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) 
of title 28); 
 
 298.  See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007) (“This Court’s remedial 
opinion in United States v. Booker instructed district courts to read the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines as ‘effectively advisory[.]’ In accord with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 
Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must 
consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”) (citations omitted); see also Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines are only one of the factors to 
consider when imposing sentence . . . .”). 
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(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to 
any amendments made to such policy statement by act of 
Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet 
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into 
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect 
on the date the defendant is sentenced; 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.299 
When considering the § 3553(a) factors, district courts are 
instructed to only “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the sentencing system as 
reflected in § 3553(a)(2).300 
This sea change from a mandatory regime to an advisory system 
has sent ripples to every corner of federal sentencing. To this point, 
only one district court has utilized the advisory nature of the 
Guidelines to reject the Sentencing Commission’s expanded use-of-
minor enhancement as it applies to defendants under the age of 
twenty-one.301 Now, fertile fields exist to harvest such a result in every 
jurisdiction. To this end, district courts would then apply use-of-minor 
enhancements only to defendants at least twenty-one years of age, a 
result consistent with Congress’s intent in the first place. District 
courts would accomplish this result by adopting the no-authority 
option, policy-disagreement option, or individualized-assessment 
option. 
B. The Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines System Authorizes District 
Courts to Adopt the Policy-Disagreement Option or the 
Individualized-Assessment Option to Sentence Defendants 
Without Applying the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines 
It is uncontroverted that Booker’s drastic change to the federal 
sentencing system is still being digested by the federal courts, with 
 
 299.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 300.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 301.  See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
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many challenging and nuanced issues being debated. One challenging 
issue is how best to determine the extent of a district court’s authority 
to reject a guideline based on the district court’s policy disagreement 
with the Sentencing Commission over the wisdom of the guideline. 
This part of the Article presses the issue on whether a district court 
has the discretionary authority to reject the application of section 
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to defendants under twenty-one 
years of age based solely on the court’s policy disagreement with the 
Sentencing Commission, i.e., the policy-disagreement option. This 
issue will take time to work its way through the federal sentencing 
system. That is precisely what is required in our constitutional 
republic. Hopefully, this Article will help light the path to the options 
available to sentencing courts to reject the Sentencing Commission’s 
expanded use-of-minor enhancement so that courts can impose 
appropriate sentences on defendants under the age of twenty-one who 
use minors to commit federal offenses. 
In a recent dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court’s summary 
reversal of a circuit court’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that it will take some time and effort before courts fully 
comprehend how much authority district courts have in rejecting 
guidelines based on policy disagreements: 
[Our recent sentencing cases of] Apprendi, Booker, Rita, Gall, 
and Kimbrough have given the lower courts a good deal to 
digest over a relatively short period. We should give them some 
time to address the nuances of these precedents before adding 
new ones. As has been said, a plant cannot grow if you 
constantly yank it out of the ground to see if the roots are 
healthy.302 
This Article cannot guarantee that the roots will be healthy if a 
district court adopts the policy-disagreement option by explicitly 
acknowledging a policy disagreement with the Sentencing 
Commission over section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under 
twenty-one years of age. Nevertheless, this Article provides a 
reasonable analytical framework based on Supreme Court precedent 
that authorizes district courts to do just that. 
After the Supreme Court decided Booker, one controversial issue 
launched itself to the front of the debate. That issue was the extent of 
a district court’s discretion under an advisory Guidelines system to 
issue below-Guidelines sentences dealing with the disparity in the 
 
 302.  Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 268, 270 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(per curiam). 
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federal treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine. In 
Kimbrough, the Supreme Court demonstrated that district courts have 
the authority to grant downward variances from Guidelines’ ranges 
based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing 
Commission on the wisdom of an actual guideline.303 The Court 
reached this decision in the context of the decades-long debate over 
the 100:1 disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, which 
results in the same sentences for defendants convicted of crimes 
involving 1/100 of the amount of crack cocaine than defendants who 
are convicted of crimes involving powder cocaine.304 As the Court 
described, “[u]nder the statute criminalizing the manufacture and 
distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the relevant 
Guidelines prescription, [section] 2D1.1, a drug trafficker dealing in 
crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100 
times more powder cocaine.”305 As applied, if two defendants are 
convicted of crimes involving the same amount of cocaine, the 
defendant convicted of the crack crime would receive a sentence 
“three to six times longer” than the defendant convicted of the 
powder crime.306 
The defendant in Kimbrough pleaded guilty to crimes involving 
crack and powder cocaine.307 Applying the advisory Guidelines, which 
contained the 100:1 disparity for sentencing purposes, the district 
court came up with a sentencing range of 228 to 270 months’ 
imprisonment.308 The district court concluded that the sentencing 
range was excessive, such that any sentence within this range “would 
have been ‘greater than necessary’ to accomplish the purposes of 
sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”309 The district court 
blamed this excessive sentencing range on the “disproportionate and 
unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.”310 
Contrasting the crack–powder dichotomy, the district court explained 
that had the defendant been convicted of crimes involving the same 
amount of powder cocaine, the applicable guidelines range would 
have been only 97 to 106 months, drastically lower than the range for 
 
 303.  See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91, 109–11. 
 304.  See id. at 94–111. 
 305.  Id. at 91. 
 306.  Id. at 94. 
 307.  See id. at 91. 
 308.  See id. at 92. 
 309.  Id. at 92–93. 
 310.  Id. at 93. 
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crack cocaine.311 Deciding that the statutory minimum sentence, which 
itself still reflected Congress’s bias against crack cocaine, was “clearly 
long enough” to satisfy § 3553(a)’s purposes, the district court 
sentenced the defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment.312 On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that any sentence “outside the 
[G]uidelines[‘] range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a 
disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder 
cocaine offenses.”313 
Disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held 
“that, under Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, 
are advisory only, and that the [Fourth Circuit] erred in holding the 
crack–powder disparity effectively mandatory.”314 Although the 
district court must consider the Guidelines’ range as one sentencing 
factor, the district court may also conclude that a sentence within the 
Guidelines’ range exceeds what is necessary under § 3553(a). Thus, 
the Court held that when determining the appropriate sentence, a 
district court has the authority to “consider the disparity between the 
Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses.”315 
Even though the Supreme Court in Kimbrough held that the 
district court’s rejection of a Guidelines sentence based solely on 
policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission did not result in 
an unreasonable sentence, the Court nonetheless cautioned that such 
policy disagreements should not result in a panacea to reject all 
guidelines.316 The Court tried to tamp down any notion that the 
Guidelines can be effectively discarded in a sentencing free-for-all.317 
The Court cautioned that although the Guidelines are only advisory, 
the Sentencing Commission nevertheless plays a key role in 
sentencing because of its capacity (which courts lack) to “base its 
determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a 
professional staff with appropriate expertise.”318 Furthermore, because 
the Sentencing Commission serves Congress’s goals in formulating 
and refining national sentencing standards, district courts are still 
required to “treat the Guidelines as the ‘starting point and the initial 
 
 311.  See id.  
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
 314.  Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  See id. at 108–09. 
 317.  See id. 
 318.  Id. at 108–09 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 
2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)).  
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benchmark’” at sentencing.319 Thus, “in the ordinary case, the 
Commission’s recommendation of a sentencing range will ‘reflect a 
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s 
objectives.’”320 
The Court tried to boil down the analytical options when a 
district court seeks to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines’ 
range: 
In light of [a district court’s] discrete institutional strengths [to 
judge a particular case and facts in light of the § 3553(a) factors], 
a district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines 
may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a 
particular case “outside the ‘heartland’ to which the 
Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.” On the 
other hand, while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer 
review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from 
the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the 
Guidelines range “fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) 
considerations” even in a mine-run case.321 
Thus, district courts have two options when sentencing outside 
the Guidelines’ range based on the court’s conclusion that a 
Guidelines sentence is not warranted under § 3553(a). First, a district 
court can utilize the individualized-assessment option by using its 
institutional strength to make an individualized assessment of what 
sentence is reasonable for an individual defendant based on the 
unique facts and circumstances of a single case. Second, a district 
court can utilize the policy-disagreement option and infringe on the 
Sentencing Commission’s institutional strength to make national 
sentencing policy by disagreeing with the Sentencing Commission on 
policy grounds, regardless of the facts and circumstances of a single 
case. 
The Supreme Court in Kimbrough blessed the district court’s use 
of the policy-disagreement option. In doing so, the Court explained 
that the district court’s downward variance from the Guidelines’ range 
 
 319.  Id. at 108 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)). 
 320.  Id. at 109 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)); see also Gall, 
552 U.S. at 46 (“It is also clear that a district judge must give serious consideration to the 
extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an 
unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with 
sufficient justifications. For even though the Guidelines are advisory rather than 
mandatory, they are, as we pointed out in Rita, the product of careful study based on 
extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing 
decisions.”). 
 321.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines’ crack–powder 
disparity was warranted because even if the Sentencing Commission 
had not changed the Guidelines, it had expressed its distaste for the 
congressionally induced disparity.322 The Court applauded the district 
court for explaining that it “accorded weight to the Sentencing 
Commission’s consistent and emphatic position that the crack–powder 
disparity is at odds with § 3553(a).”323 The Court indicated that the 
district court had merely disagreed with the Sentencing Commission 
in a case where even the Sentencing Commission itself disagreed with 
the Guidelines, as seen by its subsequent act of reducing the crack–
powder disparity to between 25:1 and 80:1.324 
Given Kimbrough and the Sentencing Commission’s adoption of 
guidelines with less than a 100:1 crack–powder disparity, what is the 
authority of a district court under the advisory sentencing system to 
issue a below-Guidelines sentence if the court adopts the 
policy-disagreement option and disagrees with even a 25:1 or 80:1 
disparity? In Spears v. United States, the Court again addressed a 
district court’s policy disagreement with the 100:1 crack–powder 
disparity and its impact on sentencing.325 The district court first 
calculated the advisory Guidelines range—324 to 405 months’ 
imprisonment—for the defendant convicted of distributing crack and 
powder cocaine.326 Based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, 
the district court concluded that the Guidelines’ 100:1 crack–powder 
ratio “yielded an excessive sentence.”327 Concluding that the 100:1 
ratio was unjust, the district court recalculated the defendant’s 
sentencing range to reflect a 20:1 ratio—a ratio the district court 
favored for policy reasons—resulting in a sentencing range of 210 to 
262 months.328 The district court then sentenced the defendant to 240 
months in prison, the statutory minimum.329 The Eighth Circuit 
reversed the district court, concluding that district courts are not 
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authorized to simply substitute a new ratio for the Guidelines’ 100:1 
ratio.330 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit, making 
clear that the Court had held in Kimbrough “that district courts are 
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine 
Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”331 
The Court specifically adopted the following language from the 
dissenting opinion from the Eighth Circuit’s decision as a correct 
interpretation of Kimbrough: 
The Court thus established that even when a particular 
defendant in a crack cocaine case presents no special mitigating 
circumstances—no outstanding service to country or 
community, no unusually disadvantaged childhood, no 
overstated criminal history score, no post-offense 
rehabilitation—a sentencing court may nonetheless vary 
downward from the advisory guideline range. The court may do 
so based solely on its view that the 100-to-1 ratio embodied in 
the sentencing guidelines for the treatment of crack cocaine 
versus powder cocaine creates “an unwarranted disparity within 
the meaning of § 3553(a),” and is “at odds with § 3553(a).” The 
only fact necessary to justify such a variance is the sentencing 
court’s disagreement with the [G]uidelines—its policy view that 
the 100-to-1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity.332 
The Supreme Court reiterated that district courts have two 
options when imposing sentences outside the Guidelines’ range. First, 
the Supreme Court explained that a district court’s decision to vary 
from the Guidelines’ range is entitled to great respect when the facts 
of a particular case are “outside the heartland” to which the 
Sentencing Commission intended the Guidelines to apply.333 In other 
words, when a variance is based on the district court’s institutional 
strength to make individualized assessments based on the unique facts 
and circumstances in a given case, the level of deferential respect is 
greatest. Again, this Article refers to this as the 
individualized-assessment option. Second, the Supreme Court made 
clear that an “‘inside the heartland’ departure (which is necessarily 
based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines and necessarily 
 
 330.  See id. at 263 (citing United States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2008) 
[hereinafter Spears II] (en banc), vacated, Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 1090, 1090 
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 331.  Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added). 
 332.  Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Spears II, 533 F.3d at 
719 (Colloton, J., dissenting)). 
 333.  See id. at 264 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 89 (2007)). 
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disagrees on a ‘categorical basis’),” rather than an individualized 
assessment, “may be entitled to less respect.”334 Stated differently, 
when a district court finds itself farther away from its institutional 
strengths to sentence a particular defendant in a given case, and 
invades the institutional strengths of the Sentencing Commission to 
set national sentencing policy through the issuance of guidelines to 
apply to all defendants, the district court’s national policy 
determinations are entitled to less respect and some deference is owed 
to the Sentencing Commission’s judgment. This is what I term the 
policy-disagreement option. 
The Supreme Court then addressed the level of respect afforded 
a district court based on a specific policy disagreement with the 
Sentencing Commission over the crack–powder disparity. The Court 
explained that although a district court’s policy disagreement over a 
guideline is generally not entitled to great respect, a policy 
disagreement specifically on the 100:1 crack–powder disparity is 
entitled to respect.335 The Court explained that because the disparity 
emanated generally from Congress, and not the Sentencing 
Commission’s institutional expertise, and, partly, because even the 
Sentencing Commission itself had criticized that ratio, district courts 
are actually not locked in a policy battle with the Sentencing 
Commission.336 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized “district courts’ 
authority to vary from the crack[-]cocaine Guidelines based on [a] 
policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an 
individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a 
particular case.”337 The Court made clear “that district courts are 
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine 
Guidelines [100:1 crack–powder ratio] based on a policy disagreement 
with those Guidelines,” which “necessarily permits adoption of a 
replacement ratio.”338 
After the Supreme Court’s approval of district courts’ authority 
to categorically reject the crack–powder disparity based on policy 
disagreements with the Sentencing Commission, it is now possible to 
eliminate the crack–powder disparity altogether under the advisory 
Guidelines system. District courts have begun to do just that. By 
rejecting any crack–powder disparity on policy grounds, it needs to be 
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stressed that district courts are not using the 
individualized-assessment option. Instead, district courts are using the 
policy-disagreement option, which authorizes the courts to act as 
policymakers in disagreeing with the Sentencing Commission on what 
sentences best serve the sentencing policies in § 3553(a). In United 
States v. Greer, for example, a federal district court in Texas 
determined that the advisory Guidelines range for a defendant 
convicted of distributing crack cocaine was between seventy and 
eighty-seven months’ imprisonment.339 Based solely on a policy 
disagreement over the disparity, the district court used the policy-
disagreement option to “adopt[] a 1-to-1 ratio for this and all future 
crack cocaine cases in determining the base offense level.”340 When the 
district court applied a 1:1 ratio to the facts of the case, the sentencing 
range decreased substantially to twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ 
imprisonment.341 After considering the remaining § 3553(a) factors, 
the district court settled on a sentence of twenty-four months’ 
imprisonment, nearly two-thirds less than the lowest end of the 
Guidelines’ range.342 Given the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Kimbrough and Spears, appellate courts would have little authority to 
reject a district court’s adoption of the policy-disagreement option to 
replace a 100:1, 80:1, or 25:1 sentencing disparity with a 1:1 ratio, at 
least until the Sentencing Commission utilizes its institutional strength 
to explain why the disparity should be given weight in mine-run cases. 
To the extent that district courts and the Sentencing Commission have 
a policy disagreement over an issue not within the Sentencing 
Commission’s institutional areas of expertise, the Supreme Court will 
not force district courts in an advisory sentencing system to defer to 
the Sentencing Commission’s belief as to the appropriate sentences 
under § 3553(a). 
Why did this Article spend so much time explaining the policy-
disagreement option in the context of the crack–powder-disparity 
debate? It is critical that district courts—as well as criminal 
 
 339.  699 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
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 341.  See id. at 880. 
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defendants and prosecutors—fully comprehend the sentencing 
options under an advisory-Guidelines system based on policy 
disagreements with the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of 
guidelines. The extent to which a district court may exercise its 
discretionary authority to impose an outside-Guidelines sentence 
based on policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission will 
take time to sort out. But one thing is crystal clear: the Supreme Court 
has concluded that a district court can choose to disregard the 
Guidelines based solely on an ideological policy disagreement with 
the Sentencing Commission.343 When district courts disagree with the 
Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines based on policy grounds, 
however, the Supreme Court has stated that the courts are not 
entitled to great respect when they drift from their institutional 
strengths and tread on the Sentencing Commission’s institutional 
strengths.344 
As the Booker and Kimbrough line of cases show, the federal 
sentencing landscape has undergone a dramatic pruning in the last few 
years. Now that the Guidelines are merely advisory and district courts 
have the discretion to impose outside-Guidelines sentences based on a 
policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission or an 
individualized assessment of a defendant’s unique circumstances, 
district courts have significantly more discretion in deciding whether 
to apply section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to defendants who 
are not twenty-one years of age. As explained in Parts II to V, a 
district court’s first option is to conclude that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its congressional authority to promulgate 
section 3B1.4 without an age restriction. Under this no-authority 
option, the advisory Guidelines range will not include a two-level use-
of-minor enhancement. District courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits are foreclosed from choosing the no-authority 
option, while district courts in the Sixth Circuit already operate under 
such a framework. District courts in the remaining circuits that have 
not addressed the issue are free to adopt the no-authority option, 
which would mean that the Guidelines’ range for defendants under 
the age of twenty-one would not include a two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement. 
C. The Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines System Authorizes District 
Courts to Utilize the Policy-Disagreement Option—Based Solely 
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on Policy Disagreements with the Sentencing Commission—to 
Retract the Sentencing Commission’s Inappropriate Expansion of 
Congressional Authority and Sentence Defendants Younger than 
Twenty-One Years of Age Without Applying the Use-of-Minor 
Enhancement 
Every district court in every circuit has the authority to adopt the 
policy-disagreement option, which decides as a matter of policy that 
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement should not apply to 
defendants under the age of twenty-one. In March 2011, the Supreme 
Court decided Pepper v. United States, making crystal clear that 
district courts have the authority to adopt the policy-disagreement 
option: 
To be sure, we have recognized that the [Sentencing] 
Commission post-Booker continues to “fil[l] an important 
institutional role” because “[i]t has the capacity courts lack to 
base its determinations on empirical data and national 
experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate 
expertise.” Accordingly, we have instructed that district courts 
must still give “respectful consideration” to the now-advisory 
Guidelines (and their accompanying policy statements). As 
amicus acknowledges, however, our post-Booker decisions 
make clear that a district court may in appropriate cases impose 
a non-Guidelines sentence based on a [policy] disagreement 
with the [Sentencing] Commission’s views. That is particularly 
true where . . . the [Sentencing] Commission’s views rest on 
wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the 
sentencing statutes Congress enacted.345 
What is the propriety of utilizing the policy-disagreement option 
in section 3B1.4 cases involving defendants under the age of twenty-
one? As an initial matter, consider the Eighth Circuit’s pre-Booker 
case of United States v. Wingate, which rejected the no-authority 
option and held that the district court did not erroneously apply a 
two-level use-of-minor enhancement for an eighteen-year-old 
defendant.346 After the Eighth Circuit decided Wingate, the Supreme 
Court changed the sentencing landscape by determining that a 
mandatory Guidelines scheme was unconstitutional.347 As a result of 
its decision in Booker, the Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s 
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judgment in Wingate and remanded the case so that the Eighth Circuit 
could consider Booker’s impact on the decision.348 On remand, the 
Eighth Circuit reinstated its prior opinion and again affirmed the 
district court’s application of section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor 
enhancement to Wingate, even though the district court applied the 
enhancement while the Guidelines were still mandatory.349 
In essence, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a sea change to an 
advisory Guidelines system from a mandatory regime would not have 
prodded the district court to issue a shorter sentence.350 Stated another 
way, based on a plain error standard of review, the Eighth Circuit 
required that Wingate establish that there was a reasonable 
probability that the district court would have imposed a more lenient 
sentence under an advisory Guidelines system than it did under the 
mandatory regime.351 The Eighth Circuit concluded, “The record does 
not indicate the district court would have given Wingate a more 
lenient sentence absent Booker error.”352 
The Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion even though the 
district court (1) ultimately sentenced Wingate at the bottom of the 
Guidelines’ range, (2) complained that the court “wasn’t looking 
forward to” sentencing Wingate, and (3) exasperated that “there is 
not any good reason why” the court had to send a nineteen-year-old 
person to prison for seventy-eight months.353 Notwithstanding the 
district court’s equivocal statements about Wingate’s age and the 
appropriateness of the sentence, the Eighth Circuit found solace in its 
decision not to remand for resentencing by focusing on the district 
court’s apparent fidelity to apply the mandatory use-of-minor 
enhancement.354 In that light, the Eighth Circuit focused on the district 
court’s (1) finding that it was “crystal clear” that Wingate had used 
minors to commit a federal offense; (2) decision not to grant a 
downward departure from the mandatory sentencing range based “on 
the proximity in the ages between Wingate and the minors he used;” 
(3) confounding statement—at least when used as support for the 
notion that the district court would not have granted a shorter 
 
 348.  See Wingate v. United States, 543 U.S. 1107, 1007 (2005). 
 349.  See United States v. Wingate, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 350.  See id. at 888–89 (finding no plain error in Wingate’s sentence that resulted from 
the district court’s application of mandatory Guidelines because the district court would 
not have imposed a more lenient sentence if given the opportunity). 
 351.  See id. 
 352.  Id. at 889. 
 353.  See id. 
 354.  See id. 
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sentence if the Guidelines were merely advisory—that “the law is 
what it is and the [G]uidelines, at least in [the district court’s] mind, 
were clear as to what the penalty in this case is;” and (4) conclusion 
that “both the Congress and the Sentencing Commission” treat 
Wingate’s offense as serious.355 
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether the district 
court would have used either the policy-disagreement option or the 
individualized-assessment option (given Eighth Circuit precedent as 
outlined above in Part IV.B., the district court would have been 
foreclosed from considering the no-authority option) to impose a 
below-Guidelines sentence for Wingate under an advisory Guidelines 
system. Going forward, however, every district court (including the 
district court that sentenced Wingate) has the discretionary authority 
to reject section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement for defendants 
under the age of twenty-one by utilizing the policy-disagreement 
option or the individualized-assessment option. 
How should a district court record its adoption of the policy-
disagreement option to reject the application of the Sentencing 
Commission’s use-of-minor enhancement to defendants under the age 
of twenty-one? What explanation should a district court electing to 
use the policy-disagreement option place on the record as the 
rationale for imposing a below-Guidelines sentence for a defendant 
under age twenty-one who uses a minor to commit a federal offense? 
The district court should explicitly recognize that it has a policy 
disagreement with the Sentencing Commission over the application of 
section 3B1.4 to defendants who are not twenty-one years of age such 
that applying the use-of-minor enhancement would not serve the 
purposes of § 3553(a)(2). In other words, a district court should not 
mask its policy disagreement as if it were using the individualized-
assessment option on what would be a reasonable sentence for this 
particular defendant.356 In exercising its authority under the policy-
 
 355.  See id. 
 356.  In United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, the district court refused to apply section 
3B1.4 to enhance the sentence of a defendant who used his minor girlfriend because the 
defendant was a minor when he began using his girlfriend to commit federal offenses: 
The spirit of the enhancement is to punish adults who exploit minors, and I don’t 
feel that [the defendant] fits this mold, because his girlfriend was very close to 
him in age and he wasn’t really exploiting her so much as he was misleading his 
wife. 
522 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2008). When reviewing the district court’s sentencing 
decision on the applicability of section 3B1.4, the Tenth Circuit explained that “it is not 
clear whether the district judge concluded that, as a matter of law, the enhancement did 
not apply under the government’s proffered facts” or, on the other hand, “if the ruling was 
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disagreement option, a district court makes a policy determination 
that all defendants under the age of twenty-one should not receive the 
same two-level use-of-minor enhancement as defendants who are 
older than twenty-one. 
If a district court utilizes the policy-disagreement option to reject 
section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of twenty-one, 
the court must explain why the Sentencing Commission’s 
promulgation of the guideline will not carry out the purposes behind 
federal sentencing. To do this, the district court must explain that the 
Sentencing Commission’s expression of national sentencing policy 
directly contradicts Congress’s expression of national sentencing 
policy. Using the arguments in Parts II to V above, district courts 
should explain why federal sentencing policy, as reflected in the 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, does not justify the same two-
level use-of-minor enhancement for every defendant, regardless of 
age, and no matter the proximity in age between the defendant and 
minor. 
The district court should discuss the policy judgment of Congress 
when it enacted the Crime Bill and included the use-of-minor 
directive to the Sentencing Commission. Although the arguments on 
Congress’s intent and the policy behind the use-of-minor 
enhancement for adult defendants will be the same as those detailed 
in Parts II to V, the effect of those arguments under the policy-
disagreement option is not that the Sentencing Commission exceeded 
its authority (that is the no-authority option). The import of these 
policy arguments is to illustrate that the district court is carrying out 
congressional intent on the sentencing of defendants under the age of 
twenty-one rather than the Sentencing Commission’s unjustified 
approach. A district court utilizing the policy-disagreement option will 
 
based on a factual finding.” Id. at 1115. Based on Tenth Circuit precedent holding that 
section 3B1.4 can be applied to defendants under the age of twenty-one, district courts in 
that circuit do not have the authority to adopt the no-authority option. Id. (citing U.S. v. 
Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2003)). In Pena-Hermosillo, the Tenth Circuit 
also reversed the district court’s attempt to use the policy-disagreement option (or perhaps 
the individualized-assessment option) to not use section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor 
enhancement, concluding that “the district court’s alternative rationale [was] procedurally 
unreasonable, because [it was] inadequately explained.” Id. at 1117. This holding 
underscores how important it is for a district court to make a rational and detailed 
explanation as to why the court is not applying section 3B1.4 to enhance sentences for 
defendants under the age of twenty-one, whether based on the no-authority option, policy-
disagreement option, or individualized-assessment option. This Article strives to supply 
that rational and detailed explanation to district courts for their use in sentencing 
defendants who are not twenty-one yet. 
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conclude that Congress’s approach to enhancing sentences only for 
adult defendants over the age of twenty-one who use minors to 
commit federal offenses better serves the sentencing purposes in § 
3553(a) than the Sentencing Commission’s one-size-fits-all approach 
to sentence every defendant—no matter how old or how young—by 
using the same two-level use-of-minor enhancement. 
A district court’s rejection of the Sentencing Commission’s 
expertise on uniform national sentencing policy will not be entitled to 
great respect if the Sentencing Commission utilized its institutional 
expertise in determining that § 3553(a) requires that all defendants—
regardless of age—receive a two-level enhancement for using any 
minor, even if the minor is much younger, barely younger, or even 
older than the defendant. As seen in Kimbrough and Spears, the 
Sentencing Commission loses its vaulted status as a body entitled to 
great deference when it cannot show that its institutional expertise 
produced a sentencing policy. In the context of sentencing defendants 
under the age of twenty-one for using minors to commit federal 
offenses, the Sentencing Commission has not demonstrated 
institutional expertise as to why the factors listed in § 3553(a) would 
be satisfied only through an application of the same use-of-minor 
enhancement for every defendant, regardless of age. Instead of 
utilizing its institutional strengths, the Sentencing Commission simply 
promulgated a congressional directive in a “slightly broader form.” In 
promulgating an enhancement pursuant to the congressional directive, 
the Sentencing Commission wholly abrogated the relevance of the 
defendant’s age in sentencing. Additionally, the Sentencing 
Commission apparently concluded, without explanation, that the 
proximity in age between the defendant and the minor used is also 
irrelevant in meting out punishment consistent with § 3553(a). 
Because there are no policy reasons or empirical data explaining these 
unsupported conclusions, the Sentencing Commission’s decision to 
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement without age restrictions is 
not entitled to deference. This is particularly true when the Sentencing 
Commission defies Congress’s intent. District courts are thus free to 
disregard the Sentencing Commission’s policy decision and fully 
embrace Congress’s expression of policy.357 
 
 357.  Interestingly, one federal circuit judge has indicated that defendants may be able 
to argue that certain guidelines—such as section 3B1.4—may even “be irrelevant to 
whether the sentence a party proposes is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to 
satisfy” some of the purposes of sentencing in § 3553(a)(2). See United States v. Irey, 612 
F.3d 1160, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). If a district court decided to reject an advisory Guidelines sentence under the 
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After utilizing the policy-disagreement option to categorically 
reject section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of 
twenty-one, a district court would then calculate a Guidelines range 
without a use-of-minor enhancement. If the district court determined 
that an upward variance is required for a defendant’s use of a minor, 
then the court is free to apply its own use-of-minor enhancement to 
reach an appropriate sentence in the case. The import of a district 
court’s discretion in an advisory Guidelines system is not to freely 
disregard the Sentencing Commission’s justification for sentencing; 
rather, it is to apply sound sentencing policy consistent with § 3553(a). 
Even if a district court utilizes the policy-disagreement option, it must 
still utilize the individualized-assessment option to determine the 
appropriate sentence for a particular defendant. All district courts are 
required to use the individualized-assessment option in every case. 
One district court has apparently utilized the policy-disagreement 
option in a post-Booker case to reject the application of section 
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to a defendant under the age of 
twenty-one. The district court in Delarosa surveyed the federal circuit 
decisions on whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded 
congressional authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 without age 
restrictions for defendants.358 Even though the Second Circuit had not 
decided the issue, leaving the district court free to do so, the district 
court nonetheless refused to take sides on the circuit split.359 In 
essence, it rejected the opportunity to adopt the no-authority option. 
The court nevertheless still refused to apply the Sentencing 
Commission’s use-of-minor enhancement to a defendant who was a 
minor and who used other minors who were older than the defendant 
to commit a federal offense.360 In deciding not to apply a clearly 
applicable guideline—section 3B1.4 applies to all defendants 
regardless of age—the district court concluded that Congress never 
intended the use-of-minor enhancement to apply to minors who are 
younger than the minors used to commit the federal offense.361 
In effect, the district court utilized the policy-disagreement option 
by issuing a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission 
 
policy-disagreement option, the court would be entitled to no level of deference or respect 
if the court’s wholesale rejection of a guideline included a guideline properly promulgated 
under a congressional directive. 
 358.  See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 359.  See id.  
 360.  See id. 
 361.  See id. 
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over the appropriate sentence under § 3553(a). The district court was 
not using the individualized-assessment option to determine the 
appropriate sentence only for this particular defendant. The court was 
declaring that its view of national sentencing policy—consistent with 
congressional intent—differed from the Sentencing Commission’s 
such that the court would never apply a use-of-minor enhancement to 
defendants under the age of eighteen who use minors older than the 
defendant to commit a federal offense. Under the advisory Guidelines 
system, the district court in Delarosa acted well within its discretion to 
ignore a guideline that results in a sentence that is greater than 
necessary to carry out the purposes of § 3553(a). 
By exercising the policy-disagreement option, the district court in 
Delarosa imposed a sentence on the defendant drastically below the 
Guidelines’ sentence. If the court had applied a two-level use-of-
minor enhancement under section 3B1.4, the defendant’s offense level 
would have been 41. Given the offense level and a criminal history 
category of II, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines 
would have been between 360 months’ and life imprisonment. By 
rejecting a use-of-minor enhancement for the seventeen-year-old 
defendant who used older seventeen-year-old minors to commit the 
federal offenses, the district court calculated a Guidelines’ range of 
between 292 and 365 months’ imprisonment based on an offense level 
of 39 and the same criminal history category.362 Further using the 
discretion authorized by Booker, which inherently includes the 
individualized-assessment option, the district court sentenced 
Delarosa to 188 months’ imprisonment.363 The defendant’s resulting 
sentence was nearly half of the bottom of the Guidelines’ range that 
included a two-level use-of-minor enhancement. That is an 
outstanding illustration of the high stakes that surround the issue of 
national sentencing policy for use-of-minor enhancements for adult 
defendants over the age of twenty-one as opposed to younger 
defendants. 
Once the district court properly utilizes the policy-disagreement 
option to reject section 3B1.4’s application to all defendants, appellate 
courts should defer to the district court. The Eleventh Circuit 
poetically described a reviewing court’s obligation to defer to a district 
court’s proper use of its sentencing discretion under the advisory 
Guidelines system: “Because of the substantial deference district 
 
 362.  See id. at *5–6. 
 363.  See id. at *6, *8. 
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courts are due in sentencing, we give their decisions about what is 
reasonable wide berth and almost always let them pass.”364 
Another post-Booker case further illustrates how a district court 
can reasonably utilize the policy-disagreement option to reject a 
guideline. In United States v. Handy, a senior district judge in New 
York rejected, on policy grounds, a guideline that enhanced sentences 
for defendants who possess stolen firearms, regardless of the 
defendant’s knowledge that the firearm was stolen.365 In doing so, the 
district court disagreed with various circuit courts in concluding that 
section 2K2.1(b)(4) of the Guidelines should not apply unless a 
defendant knew or should have known that a firearm was stolen.366 
The district court questioned the constitutionality of section 
2K2.1(b)(4), which can be appropriately characterized as exercising 
the no-authority option. The court also made a passing reference that 
the § 3553(a) factors do not support the application of strict liability—
as opposed to a knowledge requirement—for possessing a stolen 
gun.367 This wholesale, categorical rejection of a guidelines’ use in all 
similar cases constitutes the utilization of the policy-disagreement 
option, which effectively makes a policy decision on what the national 
sentencing policy should be on an issue. This analytical approach 
indicates that if a reviewing court disagrees with a guideline on legal 
grounds under the no-authority option—in this case, that section 
2K2.1(b)(4)’s strict liability requirement is unconstitutional—then the 
district court should also seek safe harbor in employing the policy-
disagreement option.368 
 
 364.  United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1225 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); but see id. at 
1169–80, 1199–1225 (holding that a district court’s downward variance from a Guideline’s 
sentence based on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission’s choice to 
promulgate Guidelines to sentence pedophiles was unreasonable for a host of reasons). 
 365.  570 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 366.  See id. at 439–40; but see United States v. Black, 386 F. App’x 238, 241–42 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that section 2K2.1(b)(4)’s strict liability standard is valid); United 
States v. Rolack, 362 F. App’x 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Perez, 585 
F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 553–54 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). 
 367.  See Handy, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 440. 
 368.  Consistent with the principles enunciated in Kimbrough and Spears, numerous 
federal courts have demonstrated that district courts have the discretionary authority to 
reject various guidelines solely for policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission 
about the need to apply an enhancement across-the-board as a categorical matter (the 
policy-disagreement option), as opposed to simply making an individualized assessment 
that an enhancement should not apply to a particular defendant’s case (individualized-
assessment option). See, e.g., United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(acknowledging both parties’ concession that a district court acts within its authority to 
reject a career-offender guideline based solely on a policy disagreement with the 
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Following the lead of these courts and adopting the policy-
disagreement option, district courts can stand on firm ground in 
deciding to reject the Sentencing Commission’s abrogation of 
Congress’s intent to enhance sentences only for adult defendants at 
least twenty-one years old. As long as the district court expressly 
adopts the policy-disagreement option and supports its decision with 
the reasoning in this Article, the district court should not anticipate a 
reviewing court’s reversal. 
D. The Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines System Authorizes District 
Courts to Utilize the Individualized-Assessment Option—Based 
Solely on an Individualized Assessment of the Unique Facts and 
Circumstances of a Single Case—to Sentence Defendants Younger 
than Twenty-one Years of Age Without Applying the Use-of-
Minor Enhancement 
Even if a district court chooses not to utilize the no-authority 
option or the policy-disagreement option to reject wholesale section 
3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of twenty-one, it can 
still utilize the individualized-assessment option by using its 
institutional strength to impose an outside-Guidelines sentence based 
on the unique facts and circumstances of a single case that 
demonstrate that the application of a use-of-minor enhancement to a 
particular defendant under the age of twenty-one does not serve the 
purposes of federal sentencing under § 3553(a)(2).369 This Article’s 
focus is not to convince district courts to adopt the individualized-
assessment option in sentencing defendants under the age of twenty-
one who use minors to commit federal offenses. As fully explored 
already, this Article contends that the Sentencing Commission 
 
Sentencing Commission); United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the district court acted unreasonably in failing to understand that it could 
focus on the age of the defendant to impose a below-Guidelines sentence based solely on a 
policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 
571 F.3d 568, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court acted within its 
authority to reject an illegal-reentry guideline based solely on a policy disagreement with 
the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 194–95, 197 (2d Cir. 
2008) (holding that the district court acted within its authority to reject a firearms guideline 
based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission); United States v. 
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (rejecting a guideline in a child 
pornography case based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission). 
 369.  Again, the key distinction between the policy-disagreement option and the 
individualized-assessment option is that the first option applies the district court’s policy 
decision to all similar cases while the second option only reflects the district court’s 
decision in a particular case involving a particular defendant. 
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exceeded its congressional authority and defied Congress’s intent by 
setting national sentencing policy with a use-of-minor enhancement 
that makes the age of a defendant wholly irrelevant for sentencing 
purposes. The result of this national policy is that every defendant 
who uses a minor to commit a federal offense—no matter the age of 
the defendant or the proximity in ages between the defendant and 
minor used—will receive the same two-level enhancement. 
Notwithstanding this Article’s focus on the Sentencing Commission’s 
misuse of its authority in promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement 
without an age restriction, the Article ultimately seeks to ensure that 
sentencing courts faithfully carry out Congress’s intent to make age a 
relevant factor in applying the use-of-minor enhancement. To that 
end, the Article has first discussed a district court’s no-authority 
option and policy-disagreement option. The Article would be remiss if 
it then failed to also explain that the individualized-assessment option 
can provide support for a district court to grant a downward variance 
from a Guidelines sentence that includes a two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement for a defendant under the age of twenty-one. 
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough, the 
Court also decided Gall v. United States.370 In Gall, the Court 
expounded on the appropriate analytical framework that district 
courts employ when sentencing a defendant under a post-Booker 
advisory Guidelines system based on the institutionalized strengths of 
district courts in making individualized assessments: 
[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by 
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. As a 
matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, 
the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial 
benchmark. The Guidelines are not the only consideration, 
however. Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity 
to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the 
district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to 
determine whether they support the sentence requested by a 
party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines 
range is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment 
based on the facts presented. If he decides that an outside-
Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of 
the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently 
compelling to support the degree of the variance. We find it 
uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a 
more significant justification than a minor one. After settling on 
 
 370.  552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
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the appropriate sentence, he must adequately explain the 
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to 
promote the perception of fair sentencing.371 
District courts should clearly explain whether they are utilizing 
the no-authority option, the policy-disagreement option, or the 
individualized-assessment option. When a district court adopts the no-
authority option or the policy-disagreement option, reviewing courts 
will engage in a purely legal analysis of the district court’s conclusion 
to reject a guideline. Little deference is due a district court under the 
no-authority option—this is a decision that any court can make as a 
matter of law. Although little deference will be allotted a district 
court’s decision to use the policy-disagreement option,372 as long as the 
court is not infringing on either Congress’s or the Sentencing 
Commission’s authority to set national sentencing policy, then the 
court should be well within its authority to adopt the policy-
disagreement option under an advisory Guidelines system. 
When a district court utilizes the individualized-assessment 
option, however, reviewing courts owe a great deal of deference under 
an advisory sentencing system to the district court’s institutional 
strengths to impose appropriate sentences to a particular defendant in 
a given case.373 District courts should take great care to avoid 
unwittingly masking the use of the policy-disagreement option as the 
individualized-assessment option. 
The Supreme Court has cautioned district courts against 
mischaracterizing the use of their discretion. In Spears, the Court 
instructed district courts to avoid varying from the Guidelines’ range 
based on an apparent consideration of § 3553(a) factors in individual 
cases where the court simply has a policy disagreement with the 
Sentencing Commission over a guideline’s application to all similar 
 
 371.  Id. at 49–50 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Because of the important role 
the Guidelines play in the consistent administration of justice nationally, the proper 
application of the use-of-minor enhancement is critical to ensure fair sentences for 
defendants who use minors to commit federal offenses. In that regard, it is plain to see how 
the no-authority option and the policy-disagreement option serve a vital national interest, 
because both options ensure that “the starting point and initial benchmark,” a Guidelines’ 
range, is properly achieved for cases involving a defendant under the age of twenty-one 
who uses a minor to commit a federal offense. 
 372.  See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1255 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(explaining that “appellate courts should review [district] decisions more closely when they 
rest upon disagreement with Guidelines policy.”). 
 373.  See id. at 1254 (acknowledging that a “trial court typically better understands the 
individual circumstances of particular cases before it” such that appellate courts should 
provide a level of deference if the trial court adopts what this Article calls the 
individualized-assessment option). 
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cases.374 The Court stressed that district courts should openly state 
their policy disagreements rather than “masking their categorical 
policy disagreements as ‘individualized determinations.’”375 According 
to the Court, a district court’s failure to be transparent with the reason 
for the variance—policy disagreement or individualized assessment—
would amount to “institutionalized subterfuge.”376 
To avoid the sleight-of-hand characterization that could lead to 
“institutionalized subterfuge,” district courts must simply ask whether 
they intend to reject the application of the use-of-minor enhancement 
to all cases involving a defendant under the age of twenty-one (which 
would indicate adoption of the no-authority option or the policy-
disagreement option) or whether they simply reject the use-of-minor 
enhancement’s application to a unique defendant in a particular case 
(which would indicate adoption of the individualized-assessment 
option). 
Assume the following facts as an example of how a district court 
can issue a reasonable, below-Guidelines sentence based on its 
adoption of the no-authority option, policy-disagreement option, or 
individualized-assessment option to reject the Sentencing 
Commission’s expanded use-of-minor enhancement. Forty-year-old 
adult A recruits eighteen-year-old adult B and seventeen-year-old 
minor C to commit a federal offense. Recognizing opportunities for 
themselves, B and C then recruit their best friend and high-school 
classmate, minor D. At seventeen years old, D is only five days 
younger than B and five days older than C. Assuming that A, B, and C 
committed the same offenses and used minors to commit the offenses, 
the district court would then apply the Guidelines to determine the 
appropriate range. If A, B, and C had the same criminal history, then 
the Guidelines’ range could be the same for the defendants. Adopting 
the no-authority option or the policy-disagreement option, only A 
would receive a two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section 
3B1.4. Thus, A’s Guidelines’ range, the initial starting point for 
sentencing, would be higher than the range for B and C. 
Without use of the no-authority option or the policy-
disagreement option, however, the Guidelines’ range would be the 
same for A, B, and C. Under an advisory sentencing system, the 
Guidelines’ range is only one factor to consider in meting out the 
appropriate punishment for each individual defendant. The district 
 
 374.  See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009). 
 375.  Id. at 266. 
 376.  See id. 
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court must consider the remaining § 3553(a) factors to ensure that 
each defendant is given a sentence that is not greater than necessary 
to carry out the purposes of federal sentencing. This is the point at 
which the individualized-assessment option plays an important role. 
Utilizing the individualized-assessment option, the district court could 
conclude that A, B, and C should not all receive the same sentence 
regardless of the application of the two-level use-of-minor 
enhancement to set each defendant’s Guidelines’ range. Based on its 
analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court could stand on solid 
ground in exercising its significant discretion to impose shorter 
sentences for B and C and a longer sentence for A. That is, the district 
court can determine what is an appropriate sentence for each of the 
defendants under the individualized-assessment option. This option 
allows the district court to consider anew the relevance of the 
defendant’s age and the proximity in age between the defendants and 
the minors used. If the Seventh Circuit was correct in its speculation 
that the Sentencing Commission could have determined that some 
defendants under the age of twenty-one can exert as much influence 
over minors as do defendants over the age of twenty-one, then the 
individualized-assessment option is the perfect place in the analytical 
framework to reach this result. Otherwise, Congress’s intent to focus 
enhanced sentences on adult defendants at least twenty-one years of 
age who corrupts minors becomes insignificant when every defendant, 
regardless of age, gets the same enhancement. 
One might assume that the district court inherently reached the 
same conclusion it would have had it adopted the no-authority option 
or the policy-disagreement option. This is an unfair assumption. 
Because the district court has the discretion under an advisory 
Guidelines system, the district court can choose to vary from the 
Guidelines by applying a sentence the court deems appropriate for a 
certain case. For example, the court could reject the two-level use-of-
minor enhancement in favor of a one-level use-of-minor enhancement 
for B based on B’s age and proximity in age to D. Similarly, the court 
could decide to impose a three-level use-of-minor enhancement for A, 
who is significantly older than the minors used to commit a federal 
offense. Finally, the court could choose not to apply a use-of-minor 
enhancement at all for C, the youngest of the defendants who used a 
minor older than C himself to commit a federal offense. 
One district court has apparently utilized the individualized-
assessment option to impose a sentence on a defendant under the age 
of twenty-one regardless of the validity of section 3B1.4’s application. 
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In United States v. Hawkins, the district court hedged its bets by 
explicitly stating that regardless of whether it had erroneously applied 
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement such that the sentencing 
range was improperly inflated, the court would have sentenced the 
defendant to the same 121 months’ imprisonment.377 The district court 
said it would have imposed an upward variance from the advisory 
sentencing range based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.378 
This decision does not demonstrate a court’s policy objection to the 
application of the use-of-minor enhancement, but rather stands as an 
example of a district court’s attempt to use the individualized-
assessment option in a particular case to apply an enhancement that is 
required to mete out appropriate punishment for a particular 
defendant. It further demonstrates that as far as section 3B1.4 is 
concerned, district courts have as much authority as the Sentencing 
Commission to determine the appropriate sentence for a defendant 
under the age of twenty-one who uses a minor to commit a federal 
offense. In Hawkins, the district court simply utilized the 
individualized-assessment option to decide that a use-of-minor 
enhancement was appropriate for a defendant under the age of 
twenty-one even if it had generally decided that the no-authority 
option and policy-disagreement option were viable in the mine-run 
cases. 
Admittedly, there has been much confusion about the amount of 
discretion that district courts enjoy under an advisory Guidelines 
system. Federal circuit courts have struggled with reviewing non-
Guidelines sentences for reasonableness.379 As long as district courts 
display a clear understanding of the difference between their 
institutional strengths and the Sentencing Commission’s institutional 
strengths, district courts should feel comfortable in imposing 
sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to carry 
out the sentencing purposes contained in § 3553(a).380 
 
 377.  No. 08-CR-66-LRR, 2009 WL 2253188, at *13 (N.D. Iowa July 28, 2009), aff’d 
sub nom., United States v. Jones, 612 F.3d 1040, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 378.  See id. 
 379.  See, e.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Russell, 537 F.3d 6, 
13–14 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Gunter, 527 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. 
Ct. 2051 (2009); Spears I, supra note 328; Spears II, supra note 329. 
 380.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). In his concurring opinion in Pepper, Justice Breyer 
provided a helpful, succinct framework on how best to conceptualize the sentencing roles 
played by Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the judiciary: 
[Congress] create[s] a Sentencing Commission with authority to develop 
sentencing policy embodied in the Guidelines. The Guidelines are to further 
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In summarizing Part VI, district courts accomplish the objective 
of the Guidelines—to impose appropriate sentences—by employing a 
three-step analytical framework. Under the no-authority option, 
district courts should determine whether the Sentencing Commission’s 
promulgation of a guideline complies with a congressional directive. 
As discussed in Parts II to V, this Article contends that the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its congressional authority in promulgating 
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement without an age restriction 
for defendants. Based on the legal conclusion that section 3B1.4 
cannot be applied to defendants under the age of twenty-one, district 
courts should calculate the advisory Guidelines range without 
applying the two-level use-of-minor enhancement for defendants who 
were not yet twenty-one when they used a minor to commit a federal 
offense. Even if a district court utilizes the no-authority option, the 
court is still free to use the individualized-assessment option to impose 
the appropriate sentence under § 3553(a) to a particular defendant, 
which could increase or decrease the sentence from the Guidelines’ 
range. 
If a district court rejects the no-authority option and decides that 
the Sentencing Commission acted within its congressional authority in 
promulgating section 3B1.4 without an age restriction for defendants 
(or if the district court resides in the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, or 
Tenth Circuits, where that decision has already been reached), then 
the district court may nonetheless use the policy-disagreement option 
to reject the application of section 3B1.4 to defendants under the age 
of twenty-one. To do so, district courts must explain that the 
Sentencing Commission failed to utilize its institutional strengths and 
sentencing expertise in promulgating section 3B1.4 and that 
Congress’s approach to focus on adult defendants at least twenty-one 
years of age reflects better sentencing policy. In the case of the 
Sentencing Commission’s decision to promulgate a use-of-minor 
enhancement in a “slightly broader form” than the congressional 
 
[Congress’s] basic objective, namely greater sentencing uniformity, while also 
taking account of special individual circumstances, primarily by permitting the 
sentencing court to depart in nontypical cases. By collecting trial courts’ reasons 
for departure (or variance), by examining appellate court reactions, by 
developing statistical and other empirical information, by considering the views 
of expert penologists and others, the Commission can revise the Guidelines 
accordingly. Trial courts, appellate courts, and the Commission all have a role to 
play in what is meant to be an iterative, cooperative institutional effort to bring 
about a more uniform and a more equitable sentencing system. 
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1255 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
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directive, the Sentencing Commission showed no policy expertise as 
to why defendants under the age of twenty-one who use a minor to 
commit a federal offense should receive the same two-level 
enhancement as any defendant regardless of age. Additionally, the 
Sentencing Commission did not display its expertise on why the 
proximity in age between a defendant and the minor used is irrelevant 
for sentencing purposes, such that a defendant who is younger than 
the minor used should receive the same enhancement as an adult 
defendant who is much older than the minor used. 
Finally, the post-Booker analytical framework allows district 
courts to use the individualized-assessment option in a given case to 
decide that the application of a guideline like section 3B1.4’s use-of-
minor enhancement to a particular defendant results in an excessive 
sentence when all of the § 3553(a) factors are considered. This option 
should not be used as a policy disagreement with the Sentencing 
Commission over a categorical application of the use-of-minor 
enhancement to defendants under the age of twenty-one. Rather, it 
should be limited to the unique facts and circumstances in a particular 
defendant’s case. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article in no way takes a “get-weak-on-crime” position, 
where the ultimate goal is the reduction in the lengths of sentences for 
criminals who use minors to commit federal offenses. Moreover, this 
Article does not seek to enter the general policy debate on the 
appropriate sentences for defendants who are minors. Instead, this 
Article promotes a healthy level of judicial review of the Sentencing 
Commission’s exercise of its significant authority. Whenever the 
Sentencing Commission complies with a congressional directive to 
promulgate a guideline or uses its significant discretion and 
institutional strengths to declare national sentencing policy to a broad 
class of behavior, then there can be little doubt that the Sentencing 
Commission’s policy decision should be respected in most cases. 
When the Sentencing Commission defies Congress’s intent, ignores a 
congressional directive, and exceeds its authority, courts must not 
allow that unauthorized expansion of power to go unchecked. This 
Article arms federal courts with three options to push back on the 
Sentencing Commission’s unsubstantiated grab for excessive power in 
promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement without age restrictions for 
defendants. 
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When the Sentencing Commission promulgated section 3B1.4’s 
enhancement without age restrictions for defendants, it made a 
national sentencing policy that all defendants—regardless of how old 
or how young or how close in age the defendant is to the minor 
used—should receive the same two-level enhancement for using 
minors to commit federal offenses. A review of the congressional 
directive’s plain language to the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement, the legislative history 
behind the directive, and the context in which the directive was 
enacted reveals that Congress intended that only adult defendants at 
least twenty-one years old would receive a sentence enhancement for 
corrupting a minor by using him to commit a federal offense. Because 
the Sentencing Commission ignored a clear congressional directive 
and defied Congress’s intent, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 
authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 without an age restriction for 
defendants. As such, district courts should utilize the no-authority 
option to conclude that no defendant under the age of twenty-one 
should receive a two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section 
3B1.4. Because federal circuit courts are split on the issue of the 
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate a use-of-minor 
enhancement that makes the age of a defendant entirely irrelevant, 
the Supreme Court must resolve the circuit split.381 
In addition to the legal conclusion that the Sentencing 
Commission lacked the authority to enhance sentences for defendants 
under the age of twenty-one who use minors to commit federal 
offenses (i.e., the no-authority option), district courts have two other 
options to push back on the Sentencing Commission’s unlawful 
expansion of the congressional directive. District courts can use either 
the policy-disagreement option or the individualized-assessment 
option. A district court’s adoption of either of these options would act 
as insulation from the circuit split on the no-authority option. 
 
 381.  In the meantime, district courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits do not have the authority to utilize the no-authority option, because these circuits 
have already decided that the Sentencing Commission acted within its authority in 
promulgating section 3B1.4. District courts in the Sixth Circuit also do not technically have 
the authority to utilize the no-authority option, but for a different reason—the Sixth 
Circuit has already utilized that option. District courts in all other circuits can adopt the 
no-authority option as explained in this Article. Of course, the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits, sitting en banc, could also adopt the no-authority option, which would 
resolve the circuit split and eliminate the need for the Supreme Court to address the 
viability of the no-authority option. 
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District courts have the authority to adopt what this Article coins 
the policy-disagreement option. When the Sentencing Commission 
seeks to establish national sentencing policy in an area in which it 
lacks institutional expertise by promulgating a guideline like section 
3B1.4, courts have the discretionary authority to check that use of 
power by categorically rejecting the guideline based on a policy 
disagreement. In cases involving section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor 
enhancement, this policy-disagreement option inherently rejects the 
application of the two-level use-of-minor enhancement to defendants 
under the age of twenty-one. In essence, district courts that exercise 
the policy-disagreement option are choosing to follow Congress’s 
intent on how to treat adult defendants who use minors as opposed to 
the Sentencing Commission’s unsupported decision to apply the same 
two-level enhancement to every defendant, regardless of the 
defendant’s age or the proximity in age between the defendant and 
the minor. The policy-disagreement option inherently recognizes that 
under an advisory Guidelines system, the Sentencing Commission’s 
authority to set national sentencing policy is only as strong as its 
compliance with a congressional directive or its use of its institutional 
strengths and sentencing expertise. In areas such as the appropriate 
punishment for defendants who use minors to commit federal 
offenses, the Sentencing Commission loses its vaulted status as a body 
with institutional strengths when it fails to explain why it is setting 
national sentencing policy and even more when it defies a 
congressional directive. Every district court in every circuit has the 
discretionary authority to utilize the policy-disagreement option to 
ensure that defendants under the age of twenty-one do not receive 
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement as part of the Guidelines’ 
range. 
District courts can also use their own institutional strengths in 
making individualized assessments in particular cases that fall outside 
the heartland of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Commission 
such that a variance from a Guideline’s sentence is appropriate under 
§ 3553(a). By utilizing the individualized-assessment option, district 
courts may determine that an advisory Guidelines’ sentence would 
result in an excessive sentence, thus failing to achieve the purposes of 
federal sentencing under § 3553(a). When confronted with the unique 
facts of a particular case involving a defendant under the age of 
twenty-one who used a minor to commit a federal offense, district 
courts have the authority to determine—solely for purposes of that 
particular case—that section 3B1.4’s two-level enhancement should 
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not be applied so that an appropriate sentence can be imposed on an 
individual defendant. 
Given the Sentencing Commission’s unlawful expansion of the 
congressionally directed use-of-minor enhancement, district courts 
have the authority to adopt the no-authority option, policy-
disagreement option, or individualized-assessment option to ensure 
that Congress’s intent is followed by applying section 3B1.4 only to 
defendants who are at least twenty-one years of age. As long as this 
three-option, analytical framework on how to approach the advisory 
Guidelines system is followed, district courts are well equipped to 
mete out punishment consistent with § 3553(a), while ensuring that 
the Sentencing Commission continues to play a vital role in national 
sentencing policy within its congressionally sanctioned power. 
 
